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Human-elephant conflict (HEC) over habitat has become the leading cause in the species’ 
decline and has received increasing conservation concerns. Located at the northern edge of 
the geographic distribution of Asian elephant, China’s population of ~300 wild elephants 
represent a significant conservation unit. Most of the remaining elephants are found inside the 
Xishuangbanna Natural Reserves in Yunnan Province. Since 1990, Xishuangbanna has been 
experiencing dramatic forest loss typically as the conversion of lowland tropical forests into 
rubber (Hevea brasiliensis) monocultures. These conversions have placed greater stress on 
human-elephant coexistence. 
 
Conservation programs greatly benefit when human dimensions are incorporated. Adopting 
an interdisciplinary approach, I first conducted a study among 11 villages in 2011 to 
investigate the vulnerability of rural residents to wild elephant attack according to different 
land-use forms and examined farmers’ perceptions towards the conservation of wild Asian 
elephants. Adopting classification tree methods, this study illuminated socio-ecological 
drivers shaping farmers’ attitudes towards elephant conservation. It is found that marked 
attitudinal differences were evident among farmers growing different crops, and cultivating 
area of rubber had the largest influence on declining conservation opinion. This was likely 
driven by the destruction of rubber saplings and high cost to repair this damage. Religions 
and beliefs of ethnic groups also played an important role in determining conflict intensity. In 
addition, this study reported and analyzed results of farmers’ varying coping strategies in 
damage prevention and pointed to the measures perceived to be most effective at mitigating 
HEC from multiple stakeholders’ viewpoints. Both farmers and Chinese tourists prioritized 
compensation as the possible solution. 
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To gain conservation support and reconcile local animosity, especially for smallholder rubber 
farmers, the central government introduced an insurance mechanism in 2010. However, the 
effectiveness of this centralized payment scheme has been questioned. Focusing on rubber, I 
conducted a study in Shangyong protected area in 2012, evaluated the effectiveness of the 
current payment scheme and investigated an actuarial insurance mechanism tailored to local 
conditions. I systematically documented the amount of rubber killed by elephants in villages 
neighboring Shangyong in 2011, differentiated and mapped the spatial risk, calculated the fair 
market price for rubber compensation based on Net Present Value (NPV) model, and 
calculated the spatially-explicit actuarial payout. It was found that spatial variations of risk to 
elephant attack, cost of rubber damage and the resulting insurance payout were evident 
among villages and towns. Therefore, the current centralized insurance strategy may impede 
effective funding allocation and HEC mitigation. Additionally, this study estimated the gross 
funds adequate to sustain this insurance scheme, and considered a cost-sharing mechanism 
jointly paid by the government, rubber farmers, and Chinese tourists to supplement the 
current funding insufficiency. The results showed that 61% of 208 farmers were willing to 
pay for rubber premium and 90.5% of 210 Chinese tourists were willing to donate to HEC 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Human-wildlife conflict (HWC) 
Natural habitats destruction and conversion have driven individual wild species necessarily 
coming into conflicts with human beings – defined as human-wildlife conflict (HWC). HWC 
is a face-off between people and wildlife over space and resources, resulting from soaring 
growth of human populations and development activities (Balmford et al. 2001). There are 
various types of HWC: it includes crop raiding, predation on livestock and game, property 
damage, transmission of diseases and human fatalities and injuries; by contrast, as retaliation 
for the damage incurred, people kill offending wild animals and further destroy their habitats 
(Woodroffe, Thirgood and Rabinowitz 2005). While famers might perceive wildlife as 
“pests” –any animal that consumes crops during any stage of the agriculture cycle, from 
planting to post-harvest storage (Porter and Sheppard 1998) - and subsequently prefer them 
eradicated, certain sectors of society value these wild species and want them to be preserved 
because of their ecological, social, cultural and economic importance. As a result, HWC has 
evolved into a social conflict between different interested groups (Manfredo and Dayer 
2004). 
 
HWC encompasses a wide array of species from insects, fish, birds, reptiles to mammals with 
the principal culprits being primates, rodents, ungulates (including antelope, wild boar, 
elephant, hippo, buffalo and zebra), lions, leopards and hyenas (Manfredo and Dayer 2004, 
Nelson, Bidwell and Sillero-Zubiri 2003, Balmford et al. 2001, Sitati et al. 2003). Especially, 
those intelligent, large, wide-ranging and potentially dangerous carnivores (such as bears, 
cats, wolfs) and mega-herbivores (like elephants) are blamed the most and perceived as 
problematic to livelihoods of rural residents (Woodroffe et al. 2005, Manfredo and Dayer 
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2004, Naughton-Treves 1997). Consequently, on some occasions, in the absence of any 
perceived need to conserve wildlife, they are poisoned, speared, electrocuted or shot by 
affected farmers. These retributive or pre-emptive killings can cause serious population 
declines (Maclennan et al. 2009). Currently, conflict with humans is the most serious threat 
faced by many threatened species, and their survival can only be guaranteed through 
conservation measures (Woodroffe et al. 2005). Ultimately, to conserve valuable wild species, 
we should simultaneously protect the rights and livelihoods of rural residents who genuinely 
face the conflicts and disproportionately bear the cost of conservation, especially for those 
people who are living closest to large and sometimes dangerous animals (Nelson et al. 2003). 
 
Human-elephant conflict (HEC) 
Playing an important role in the structuring of ecosystems, elephants are considered a 
keystone and umbrella species. They help the resetting and succession of forests, create 
habitats for various other species and disperse seeds for numerous plants, and conservation 
policies intended to preserve them and their habitats indirectly promote the conservation of 
entire natural systems and biodiversity (Riddle et al. 2009, Barnes 1996). As the largest land 
mammal on the earth, they are found in 37 range states in sub-Saharan Africa (the African 
elephant- Loxodonta africana) and 13 states in Asia ( the Asian elephant - Elephas maximus) 
(IUCN 2011).The population of African elephants is approximately 500,000, while this 
number is rather smaller for Asian Elephants with an estimated population of only 30,000 to 
50,000 individuals (IUCN 2011). However, living inside forested habitat adds more difficulty 
in estimating the actual population size of Asian elephants (AsERSM 2006). For these two 
species, loss of habitat associated with fragmentation and degradation of forests, poaching 
and human-elephant conflicts (HEC) are the main causes of population decline. The Red List 
 3 
 
of Threatened Species categorizes the African elephant as vulnerable and the Asian elephant 
as endangered (IUCN 2011), indicating more uncertainties for Asian elephants’ long-term 
survival and highlighting a more urgent need for their conservation. Despite a smaller 
population, the Asian elephant inhabits more densely populated developing countries which 
are facing rapid economic development followed by high rate of deforestation and increasing 
interaction with humans. As reviewed by Riddle et al. (2009), the home range of the Asian 
elephant has declined dramatically from the original 9 million km
2
 to 500,000 km
2
, and most 
elephant range states have seen declines of 25% to 60% in their forest cover. Consequently, 
Asian elephants are experiencing massive contractions of their current geographic ranges and 
are relegated to small parks and patchy protected areas. In India, only 12% of the remaining 
46,880 km² of wildlands are protected within the range of its over 30,000 Asian elephant 
individuals (Kumar, Mudappa and Raman 2010) 
 
Nowadays, HEC over habitat has become the leading cause in the species’ decline and has 
received increasing conservation concerns (Woodroffe and Ginsberg 1998). HEC manifesting 
as crop-raiding occurs throughout the elephants’ range both in the forest and the savanna 
ecosystems. With regular contact with humans and crops, elephants lose fear and exhibit 
“problem behavior” (Naughton-Treves 1998, Tchamba 1996). They habitually forage on 
cultivars which are not only palatable, have greater nutrition and lower toxicity than wild 
plants, but may also ensure better reproductive success (Hoare 1999). Excellent cognitive 
skills and dietary flexibility further make them effective crop-raiders (Barnes 1996, 
O'Connell-Rodwell et al. 2000). Once elephants enter the cropland the damage is catastrophic 
(Naughton-Treves 1998). What is worse, occasionally, elephants cause human fatalities. As a 
result, the high cost of potential crop damage and the threat of being killed reinforce negative 
perceptions among rural residents and significantly reduce their tolerance to coexistence. Not 
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surprisingly, retaliatory killing of Asian elephants has been widely reported throughout their 
range states (ten of the thirteen countries) and has been categorized as one of the most serious 
threats to elephant conservation (AsERSM 2006). As illustrated by Riddle et.al (2009), in 
India, more elephants were killed through HEC than by poaching; and in Sri Lanka, in a 
decade only, there were 1,369 elephant deaths and most were attributed to HEC. With future 
human population increase – 39% to 96% by the year 2050 (Riddle et al. 2009) and elephant 
population recovery under strict preservation measures (Saberwal et al. 1994, Mech 1995), 
HEC will tend to intensify and lead to a particular challenge for both wildlife managers and 
conservationists. 
 
Mitigation measures of HEC and drawbacks 
To reduce economic cost as well as human and elephant casualties, a hierarchy of HEC 
management tactics from local to national level is adopted in resolving HEC, including 
technical measures, economic incentives and policy interventions (Nelson et al. 2003, 
Dickman 2010, Woodroffe et al. 2005). Usually, there is no single one-off technical solution, 
and a multifaceted approach is adopted. 
 
Generally, technical measures are categorized as lethal control and non-lethal control 
methods. However, lethal control is usually used for pests that are common but is restrictedly 
applicable to larger-bodied animals that are threatened and legally protected (Woodroffe et al. 
2005).  Additionally, it may only appease affected farmers but cannot eradicate the problem 
because, theoretically, controlled shooting of the “problem elephant” would lead to 
replacement by another one. Adversely, lethal control can cause social disruption among 




Non-lethal control methods mainly include guarding, deterrents, fences and barriers, 
repellents, and translocation. Locally, farmers are adopting traditional methods to reduce or 
eradicate impacts of crop damage by nuisance wildlife. Guiding, deterrents and repellents 
(visual, acoustic and chemical) are all widely used to scare elephants (O'Connell-Rodwell et 
al. 2000). For instance, the most common rural way is shouting, using noise-makers 
accompanied by fires, and throwing rocks to chase elephants away. However, these methods 
are passive and of limited use, especially when a pest is highly cognitive and intelligent, can 
overcome fear quickly and adapt to the deterrents easily. On the other hand, legislatively 
protectionist status of wildlife further compromises farmers’ ability to defend their crops 
(Nyhus et al. 2003). 
 
Electric fences and trenches are commonly built by government to prevent access by 
elephants. However, the high cost of materials makes their maintenance poor and irregular, 
which leads to reduction of their effectiveness to prevent damage. Additionally, it is 
impractical to place barriers covering the entire boundary of protected areas or parks unless it 
is sustainably funded by external agencies. Even if these measures were applied, elephants 
could find ways to go through the fences quickly. Regarding the impacts of barriers on 
elephants, there are increasing concerns from conservationists that fences can cause “isolated 
islands” leading to “pocket herds”, and may have long-term adverse impacts on elephant 
survival. In some circumstances, HEC exacerbates when elephants cannot find a way to 
return to the reserve after crossing out of the reserve’s barrier, and they may worsen the 
damage in the crop fields. Translocation is another way to remove problem elephants from 
conflict areas to resolve HEC. Despite the expensive techniques required, researchers also 
question their effectiveness due to the returning of moved elephants, maladjustment and 
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stress to them in new environment, and translocation of HEC to new sites. Additionally, more 
uncertainties arise regarding whether the new habitat fits elephants’ ecological requirements 
and can support their viability (Lahiri-Choudhury 1993).  
 
Overall, among the technical solutions, both passive local traditional methods and the 
expensive state-sponsored fences and translocation have limitations, and some have already 
been abandoned due to ineffectiveness, impracticability and unsustainability. 
 
Complexities of HEC make this problem chronic and extremely difficult to resolve. Therefore, 
as well as reducing damage, raising tolerance of farmers through economic incentives is 
equally necessary to mitigate HEC. Commonly, governments apply compensation schemes 
(in the form of cash or in-kind assistance) to reduce hostility of farmers towards wildlife by 
moderating and spreading local financial burdens. Compensation can mitigate HEC through 
increasing farmer’s tolerance, raising conservation awareness and promoting co-existence of 
rural communities especially with the world’ s large, dangerous and endangered animal 
(Maclennan et al. 2009). For example, a compensation scheme on Mbirikani Group Ranch in 
Kenya effectively reduced the number of lions being killed (Maclennan et al. 2009).  
 
As alternatives to traditional compensation schemes, researchers also turn to the private 
insurance industry (Hussain 2000, Mishra et al. 2003, Nyhus et al. 2003), and suggest 
performance-based payments (Ferraro and Kiss 2002). Similar to compensation, insurance 
schemes can be more sustainable with the involvement of the community and the alleviation 
of dependence on external funding (Dickman, Macdonald and Macdonald 2011). This 
alternative compensation mechanism can also reduce false claims as premiums increase with 
risk, provide possibilities of fair compensation on par with market value, allocate 
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responsibilities for conflicts among stakeholders and spread risk among households through a 
form of social insurance because crop loss to wildlife of individual farmers is highly 
stochastic, unpredictable, and idiosyncratic (Dickman et al. 2011, Madhusudan 2003, 
Woodroffe et al. 2005).  
 
However, economic payment itself will not essentially eliminate conflict, and linking 
monetary compensation to positive conservation outcomes is difficult (Dickman et al. 2011, 
Naughton-Treves, Grossberg and Treves 2003, Woodroffe et al. 2005). Additionally, 
measuring the success or failure of compensation schemes is intractable, and compensation 
programs usually fail due to vexing problems associated with the processes of sustainable 
fund raising, damage verification, and payment delivery (Wagner, Schmidt and Conover 1997, 
Dickman et al. 2011).  
 
Policy prevention is also incorporated into HEC mitigation that is in an 
ecological-socio-political complex. Legal protection of wildlife, for example in the 
formulation of the Wildlife Protection Act in Africa and India (Woodroffe et al. 2005), is a 
common way to prohibit killing and preserve endangered species facing anthropogenic 
threats. Establishment of parks and reserves, change of land-use policies and relocation of 
rural settlements are also centralized strategies linked to both wildlife conservation and rural 
subsistence. However, stringent legislation and exclusion of community involvement may 
create a feeling of disenfranchisement and trigger local hostility, which will in turn intensify 
HWC and undermine conservation efforts (Woodroffe et al. 2005, Wang and Macdonald 




Premises of mitigating HEC 
80% of the world’s African elephants range outside protected areas (PAs) (Hoare 2000), with 
an equally high figure for Asian elephants that frequently interact with people at forest edges 
(IUCN 2011). Importantly, effective conservation is not the suppression of wild populations 
or the exclusion of local communities, but demands “adaptive management” that promotes 
the coexistence of humans and wildlife when sharing a multiple-use landscape (Woodroffe et 
al. 2005, Dickman et al. 2011, O'Connell-Rodwell et al. 2000). 
 
To put forward a successful and cost-effective management strategy, we need to initially 
understand the risk and vulnerability of rural residents exposed to HEC, which is closely 
linked to local tolerance. Vulnerability here is not only the actual cost and magnitude of 
wildlife damage determined by environmental characteristics, but also farmers’ perceived 
cost of potential damage shaped by social factors. As for farmers’ risk of experiencing 
crop-raiding under certain ecological and geographic conditions – such as wild food 
availability, type of crops grown, the proximity of crops to forest edge, and timing of crops 
ripening (Hill 1997, Kumar et al. 2010)– may predispose certain areas particularly to risk 
while other sites are nearly unaffected (Sitati et al. 2003, Redpath and Thirgood 1999, 
Naughton-Treves 1998, Stahl et al. 2002). A better understanding of this spatial variation in 
the occurrence of conflicts can differentiate HEC areas and allow prioritization of funds and 
mitigation efforts. Correspondingly, perceived risk shaped by religious affiliation, 
expectations, ethnicity and cultural beliefs can explain why conflicts often persist and local 
antagonism remains robust even after damage has been reduced (Dickman 2010). For 
example, even a small level of wildlife damage can still elicit harsh responses. Pre-emptive 
killings may continue when a farmer’s perceived risk is too high and beyond his tolerance. 
Consequently, even a few hostile individuals can have significant impacts in terms of 
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decreasing the viability of a target wildlife population (Dickman et al. 2011). Essentially, this 
is because farmers’ perception is antecedent of their behavior and determines their tolerance 
thresholds (Manfredo and Dayer 2004). Ignoring this attitude-behavior link would impede 
successful conservation outcomes. Therefore, understanding attitudes of rural residents would 
give guidance to design effective prevention and mitigation strategies. To conclude, 
mitigating HEC requires an interdisciplinary research involving ecology, geography, 
anthropology and social science, which contributes to a deeper understanding of the root 
causes of HEC and thereby helps to find management solutions in the long run.  
 
HEC in China 
With approximately 60% of the population present in India, only a small proportion of Asian 
elephants are scattered across the other 12 range states. Located at the northern edge of their 
geographic distribution, China’s population of less than 300 wild Asian elephant individuals 
(IUCN 2011) represents a significant conservation unit. Most of the remaining elephants are 
found inside the Xishuangbanna (XB) Natural Reserves in Yunnan Province. However, 
human-inflicting mortality has caused their population to shrink further. From 1918 to 2005, 
199 elephant deaths and 8 injuries were recorded due to human-caused persecution (poaching 
and HEC). By contrast, from 1991 to 2004, an average of eight people were attacked by wild 
elephants yearly and this trend continued to increase. In only 13 years, 21 deaths and 91 
injuries by elephants were reported (XB Nature Reserve Bureau, 2005). HEC has become a 
major conservation issue in China because it is the leading threat to elephant viability and 




In the last two decades, HEC has exacerbated due to expanding economic plantations. Since 
the 1950s, with the introduction of a series of policies and development interventions at the 
national and provincial scales, XB has experienced dramatic land-use change (Xu et al. 2005). 
This conversion has put stress on human-wildlife coexistence. Habitat destruction makes 
elephants come into conflict with rural communities, leading to strong negative attitudes 
towards conservation. Crop raiding and infrastructure damage were frequently reported in XB, 
followed by increasing human casualty records. It is hence urgent to improve local tolerance 
through effective conflict resolution that will require a broad, multifaceted and truly 
interdisciplinary approach (Dickman 2010). However, few studies investigate the underlying 
socio-economic, ecological and cultural conditions shaping the tolerance threshold. By 
contrast research is mainly confined to the species-based ecology and conflict itself. 
HEC mitigation measures in China and insurance  
Traditional technical methods by farmers and compensation schemes by government have 
been employed to mitigate HWC in China, such as HEC and human-wild boar conflict (Cai et 
al. 2008). With the reducing effectiveness of most traditional methods, economic 
compensation becomes increasingly important. However, current compensation schemes in 
China mainly faced problems as funding insufficiency, unsustainability and source 
simplification (Zhou et al. 2010). Since the year 2010, insurance schemes have been firstly 
introduced to compensate farmers’ losses to wild elephants. XB government is the current 
singular buyer of the Public Liability Insurance and allocates a central budget into Tai Ping 
Yang insurance company annually for wildlife-causing damage across XB. In principle, the 
premium is evenly paid to insure all the farms and forestry land exposed to potential risk. 
Once the "public" – the rural residents living close to the protected areas – are unexpectedly 
raided or injured by wild Asian elephants, insurance agents are responsible for measuring the 
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damage and compensating farmers’ losses (Fig.1.1). However, evenly-insured strategy may 
hinder the funding allocation efficiency, and insurance agents may also not be able to set a 
reasonable indemnity price without differentiating high risk and low risk areas (Sekhar 1998). 
Despite an innovative try, this centralized insurance scheme has shortcomings: performs in 
the traditional state-sponsored way but excludes community involvement and other 
conservation funds; without considering the spatial heterogeneities of conflict intensity and 
market value of crops. Especially, rubber (Hevea brasiliensis) destruction is paid at 
US$ 2/tree regardless of age and geographically productivity.  
 
Fig.1.1 Current insurance payment scheme 
 
Additionally, HEC is a chronic problem and compensation must be sustained by sufficient 
funds to ensure a fair payment (Wagner et al. 1997, Dickman et al. 2011). Noticeably, despite 
the direct cost of wildlife damage, management, damage verification and payment transaction 
also constitutes a major cost of compensation programs, and a viable insurance scheme 
requires sustainable funds from diverse sources (Woodroffe et al. 2005, Dickman et al. 2011). 
Ideally, insurance can be envisioned with a share of premiums from forest department, 
villagers and nongovernmental organizations (Madhusudan 2003).  
 
Instead of relying purely on state-sponsored or external funds, communities first can be 
involved in the payment of insurance premiums and take responsibility for the process of 
problem solving (Fig.1.2). This insurance-based approach can also generate internal 
incentives for farmers to protect their crops, as premiums rise with risk (Hussain 2000, 
Mishra et al. 2003, Nyhus et al. 2003). However, community-based private insurance may 
still be infeasible considering the fact that farmers may not be able to buy the premium. Other 
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problems might be unwillingness to buy the insurance given a low probability of damage or 
the view that insurance is the state’s responsibility (Dickman et al. 2011).  
Premium fund-raising can be jointly supported by other stakeholders such as tourists. The 
theory supporting this approach is called payment to encourage coexistence (PEC). PEC 
states that the cost of conserving wildlife borne locally (rural communities and developing 
countries) needs to be offset in large part by tangible funds derived ultimately from the 
people who benefit the most (cities, developed countries) to incentivize coexistence and 
conservation (Dickman et al. 2011). A PEC-based compensation scheme can be tested in 
China to investigate a sharing insurance payment scheme in mitigating HEC (Fig.1.2). In 
Baltistan, such a joint insurance mechanism through a partnership between local farmers and 
private enterprises contributed to successful human-snow leopard conflict mitigation and 
simultaneously generated conservation incentives in communities (Hussain 2000). Premiums 
were jointly paid by famers through a village committee and complemented by the profits 
from ecotourism. In India, another community-based insurance program was linked to few 
retaliatory killings of snow leopard and formulation of positive local perceptions. This 
program succeeded when a monthly premium was contributed by villagers to insure livestock 
through village council, together with the creation of grazing-free areas on common land to 
enhance wild prey density, and establishment of wildlife ecotourism and handcraft market 
(Mishra et al. 2003).  
 




To ensure success of Asian elephant conservation in China, this study first aimed to integrate 
social science into mitigating strategies, based on an understanding of perceptions of rural 
residents and the underlying factors behind attitudinal differences. Specifically, I targeted 
villages that were in or abut PAs with different land uses and HEC intensity. This study aimed 
to answer: 
i. Which farmers (crops cultivated) most likely have the crop-raiding experiences with 
elephants in XB? 
ii. Whether farmers perceive elephant conservation differently according to the crops grown, 
the intensity of conflicts and economic dependence on rubber? 
iii. What are the underlying socio-ecological drivers determining farmers’ perceptions 
towards elephant conservation? 
iv. What coping strategies are used locally in damage prevention? 
v. What strategies are perceived to be most effective at mitigating HEC in the future? 
vi. How do rural residents perceive the current insurance payment scheme compared with 
governmental compensation? 
 
In addition, to gain conservation support and reconcile local animosity, this study evaluated 
the effectiveness of the current insurance scheme and developed an alternative mechanism 
tailored to local conditions, focusing on rubber payment neighboring Shangyong PA. In 
specific, this insurance mechanism considered variations of risk and inflicted economic loss 
based on the spatially-explicit intensity of elephant attacks and geographical Net Present 
Value (NPV) model of rubber. To diversify funding sources and ensure program 
sustainability, a premium cost-sharing scheme was also tested. This study aimed to answer: 
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i. Which villages/towns are under high risk of rubber attack inflicted by elephants around 
Shangyong PA and how was this damage spatially distributed? 
ii. How much is the cost to repair rubber damage in each village in par with an actuarially 
fair market price? 
iii. What amount of the minimum funding (payout) is required in each village/town if 
insurance guarantees full payment?   
iv. Whether rural residents (and who) are willing to pay for insurance to secure rubber 
farms? 
v. Whether Chinese tourists frequenting the region to see and experience elephants are 
willing to pay for wild elephant conservation?   
vi. How much funds are adequate to sustain this payment scheme and what is the 
contribution of the WTPs of farmers and tourists? 
 
This study could help policy-makers identify social-ecological factors exacerbating HEC in 
China, provide maps of risk gradients and expected payout to cover rubber damage at village 
and town level, and point to the management solutions most likely to be effective and where 
conflict mitigation efforts should be prioritized. Additionally, this study advocates the 
cost-sharing insurance mechanism which reverses a trend from a pure and passive 
government-sponsored compensation mechanism to a diverse and active multiple 
stakeholder-participant insurance scheme. As the first country introducing an insurance 
scheme for mitigating HEC in Asia, this study would also provide valuable reference to 






Chapter 2 Methods 
Background (Place, People and Elephants) 
Study area 
Covering a range of climatic zones, Yunnan is the most ecologically and ethnically diverse 
province in China. Containing the headwaters of five major river systems - the Salween, 
Irrawaddy, Mekong, Red and Yangtze, it raises more than half of China’s flora and fauna 
biodiversity, among which 335 plant species and 243 wild animals are of the country’s 
protected priority (Yang et al. 2004). The XB Dai Autonomous Prefecture (19,700km
2
, 
21°09'-22°33'N, 99°58'-101°50'E) is located on the southernmost margin of Yunnan province, 
bordering Laos to the south and Myanmar to the southwest (Fig.2.1.a). Dominantly, XB has a 
mountain-valley topography with an elevation ranging from 2429 m in the north to 477 m in 
the south (Zhu et al. 2004, Xu et al. 2005), and the major forest types are tropical seasonal 
rain forest, mountain rain forest, and subtropical evergreen broadleaf forest (Li et al. 2008). 
Representing a transition zone from sub-tropics to tropics, XB harbors the flora and fauna 
diversity from Himalayan to mainland Southeast Asia (Huijun et al. 2002). Although the 
region covers only 0.2% of the area of China, its greatest species richness, most diverse types 
of mature tropical forests and the largest forest cover area make it part of the Indo-Burma 
biodiversity hotspot (Zhu, Shi and Zhao 2005, Myers et al. 2000, Zhang and Cao 1995).  
However, driven by the transition from a planned to a market-driven economy in China, XB 
is experiencing dramatic lowland forest conversion and biodiversity loss. Since the 1950s, 
demographic growth, associated with abrupt shifts in land-use and economic policies, has 
resulted in substantial deforestation and forest fragmentation in XB (Huijun et al. 2002, Li et 
al. 2007, Xu et al. 2005). Primarily, tropical rainforest conversion into rubber monoculture 
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has been one of the most important land-use changes in the region, followed by the expansion 
of other market-oriented crops such as tea, fruit and Chinese cardamom grown in 
monocultures (Li et al. 2007, Li et al. 2008, Xu et al. 2005, Liu et al. 2006, Huijun et al. 2002, 
Ziegler, Fox and Xu 2009). Currently, forests remain mostly within the state forests and XB 
Biosphere Reserve which preserves the largest area of tropical rainforest with the richest 
biodiversity (Huijun et al. 2002, Li et al. 2007, Xu et al. 2005). XB Biosphere Reserve was 
established in 1980 and covers approximately 12% of XB land area (Li et al. 2007). It 
comprises five sub- protected areas that exist as discontinuous islands in a matrix of different 
land-use practices with forest conversion into industrial plantations or arable lands in a 5-km 
buffer area (Li et al. 2007).   
People and Livelihoods 
Diverse ethnic minorities make XB Prefecture a cultural landscape. Predominantly, XB is the 
traditional home of upland minority peoples (‘‘hill tribes’’) including Dai (the local majority 
ethnic group), Hani (Akha), and Bulang who have different ecological culture and religions 
(Xu et al. 2005).With populations periodically migrating (most in 1960s), Han People make 
up another major proportion of the total population (Huijun et al. 2002, Xu et al. 2005). Jinuo, 
Handai (subgroup of Dai), Yi, Yao and Kemu People (subgroup of Bulang) constitute other 
minor ethnic groups in XB. Traditionally, swidden -fallow agriculture was the main farming 
system lasting for a millennium in this region, but China’s shift towards an export-oriented 
economy have substantially altered these indigenous practices of agricultural patterns in 
addition to the decline and fragmentation of forest areas (Huijun et al. 2002). The Dai 
indigenously inhabited low-elevated areas by streams, and they are mainly current small 
holders of rubber plantations. Bulang are swidden agriculturalists at high-elevated mountain 
areas and often grow tea and cotton. The Hani and other minor ethnicities are “half-mountain 
tribes” usually living at intermediate elevation and planting both rubber and tea. As the most 
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migrants, Han people initially worked on state rubber farms, but with the recent 
decentralizing policy on allocating rubber farms to individuals they have become 
smallholders. Banana, maize, rice and beans are also grown in XB by rural communities for 
both subsistence and selling purpose.        
Elephant status    
Southern Yunnan contains the only remnant population of Asian elephants in China. Less 
than 300 wild individuals live scattered in the protected areas (PA) of XB, Simao and 
Lingcang prefectures (IUCN 2011), and XB Biosphere Reserve harbors the largest elephant 
population. Among the five sub-reserves of XB, Mengyang PA, located in Jionghong 
Township at northern XB, holds the main population with about 150 wild elephant 
individuals (XB Nature Reserve Bureau, 2005). They are recognized as an independent and 
isolated group without genetic communication with other reserves. Shangyong PA which 
borders Laos fosters 50-60 individuals, the second biggest elephant population (XB Nature 
Reserve Bureau, 2005). These elephants are “international”; freely crossing the border and 
moving between China and Laos. Located at the southernmost XB- Mengla Township, 
Shangyong PA is characterized by large-scale industrial “green rubber” highly encroaching 
into its buffer. Other small wild Asian elephant herds are found in Mengla PA, to the north of 
Shangyong. Due to loss and fragmentation of habitats, the decrease of home ranges inside 
nature forests, and inadequate food provision, since two decades ago, elephants have roamed 
outside PAs and gotten habituated to raid on farming crops, leading to intense HEC 




Study design – survey site selection 
This study focuses on Mengyang PA and Shangyong PA which have the main elephant 
population distribution and the most HEC reporting (XB Nature Reserve Bureau, 2011). To 
investigate underlying factors shaping farmers’ attitudes and tolerance, in principle, villages 
at elephant range with different land uses and ethnicity were targeted, all of which had 
previous experiences of crop-raiding (Fig.2.1.b). In Mengyang, 8 villages within the PA were 
selected (Fig.2.1.b1). They were mainly Bulang villages to the northwest planting tea (a few 
households had just started to plant rubber), Dai villages to the northeast planting tea and 
small-scale rubber (at early stage), and two villages Hani and Jinuo mixed with Han at the 
west PA planting mature rubber and tea. In Shangyong, 1 Hani and 2 Dai villages bordering 
east PA were chosen where large-scale small-holder rubber plantations were grown 




Fig.2.1 Study sites and rubber expansion in XB  
(a) Location of XB in Yunnan Province; (b) expansion of rubber monocultures in XB and distributions 
of disconnected nature reserves and study sites –Mengyang at the top and Shangyong at the bottom 
with main elephant populations and HEC reorting; (b1) Study sites in Mengyang PA in study 2011; 
(b2) Study sites in Shangyong PA in study 2011; (b3) Study sites in Shangyong PA in study 2012; 
 
To evaluate current insurance effectiveness, understand the spatially explicit risk of elephant 
damage and estimate a fair insurance scheme on rubber compensation, I conducted a case 
study in Shangyong PA. Shangyong is surrounded by small-holder rubber monocultures 
which historically were natural forests and elephant ranges. The frequent activity of wild 
elephants has caused considerable damage on rubber trees in this area, and compensation for 
rubber loss has become an essential but intractable issue. 26 villages reporting elephant 
occurrence in the past five years were surveyed (Shangyong Wildlife Department, 2012). 21 
of them were adjacent to PA while 6 were to its further east bordering Laos (Fig.2.1.b3).  
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Household interviews  
From June 2011 to July 2011, semi-structured interviews were conducted in Mengyang and 
Shangyong PA to examine farmers’ perceptions towards elephant conservation; and from 
January 2012 to March 2012, further interviews on the insurance scheme for 
elephant-inflicting rubber damage were administered in villages around Shangyong PA 
(Fig.2.2). Each interview took approximately 30 to 45 mins. All the interviews were 
conducted in Mandarin or Yunnan dialect, and were administrated to either the head of the 
household or the head’s wife who worked on the farms on a daily basis. Surveys attempted to 
capture information on characteristics of the households (age, gender, ethnicity, educational 
level, family size, labor availability, and income source), data on livelihoods, and farmers’ 
conservation attitudes and perceived HEC solutions. To lead free discussions, open-ended 
questions were also designed.  
 
Fig.2.2 Household interviews conducted by the author 
 
Specifically, in study 2011, I interviewed 188 households (126 in Mengyang and 62 in 
Shangyong, accounting for 30% of the total households). The questionnaires collected data 
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on socio-demographic variables, crops grown and land-holding size, perceived life obstacles, 
current mitigation method and perceived HEC solutions, and perceptions towards wild 
elephants and the current insurance scheme. Three questions were asked to farmers to 
establish their attitudes towards elephants: 1) How much of a problem are elephants? 2)  
How do you perceive elephant conservation propaganda? 3) What do you think if the number 
of wild elephants is reduced by 50%?   
For study 2012, I first identified conflict areas around Shangyong PA that were vulnerable to 
elephant attack. To make an up-to-date risk assessment, only villages experiencing rubber 
damage in the past two years were considered for household interviews. 26 villages were 
categorized into two groups after first interviewing the village heads and the forest patrolmen: 
“Yes”- with conflict reporting (crop /property damage or people injuries) from the year 2010; 
and “No” -without conflict reporting from the year 2010. Totally 208 randomly selected 
households were interviewed from “Yes” villages (20% of the total households in each 
village were sampled, and the sample size in each village was not less than 15 households). 
The questionnaire comprised four parts: socio-demographic variables of household; rubber 
mortality by elephants in 2012 (farmers provided information on the age, total number of 
rubber trees, and the number of trees killed by elephants in each plantation in 2011) and the 
total compensation received from the insurance company; local attitudes towards the 
effectiveness of current compensation, and stated perception changes towards elephants if 
economic loss is fully compensated; and willingness to pay (WTP) of farmers for insurance 
premium through a community committee and share the costs with the government (if the 
insurance guarantees full payment at the market value of all the damage caused by elephants).  
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Mapping spatial risk distribution of elephant attack around Shangyong PA 
In “Yes” villages, with the assistance of the experienced forest patrolmen and local villagers 
who were familiar with the “problem elephant” range, I recorded GPS points of elephant 
depredation in plantations with the greatest HEC reporting (Fig.2.3 and Fig.2.4). Arc Map 10 
was used to map the geographic center of rubber damage in each “Yes” village and to show 
its proximity to PA boundary. Additionally, for each village, the ratio of the total rubber 
death in 2011 to the total holding rubber of all the interviewed households (rubber mortality) 
was used to represent this village’s risk to elephant attack. I subsequently adopted the Spatial 
Analyst Kriging Interpolation method to simulate the potential influence range of HEC and 
mapped the risk gradient of elephant attacks around Shangyong PA based on rubber 
mortality.  
 




Calculation of the market value of rubber lost to the elephant attacks 
Net present value (NPV) is a time series analysis of cash flow for a given investment, 
comparing the initial value of the investment to the expected reward over the investment's 
lifespan, given some social discount rate (Yi 2012). NPV is commonly used to conduct 
market analysis of agroforestry and evaluate market value of land use options at a given 
period of time. A formulation (Equation 1) was developed to analyze the NPV of rubber in 
Hainan Province, China (Guo et al. 2006). 
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Where R(latex)t is the revenue from latex tapping in the year t; T is the rotation age of rubber; 
R(timer)T is the final harvest income from timber; Ct is the annual cost; and r is the social 
discount rate. Specifically, R(latex)t is determined by latex production that is age-associated 
and site-specific influenced by management regime and environmental factors.  
In this study, rubber attack and cost to repair this damage (Cdamage) pertain to the cost of 
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Where t’ is the age of dead rubber. After elephant attacks, rubber famers have to clear the 
dead trees, replant new seedlings and spend the double t’-year time Ct’ to re-raise the tree 
until the original age before attack. Additionally, when other older rubber in the same 
plantation get to their final year for timber harvest, the later-replanted trees are also chopped 
down and lose the (T-t’)-year NPV revenue gains (NPVT-t’) (Fig.2.5). Weighted-average age 
was used to represent age of trees attacked at each village, and Cdamage was calculated based 
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Fig.2.5 Cost of rubber damage 
NPV of smallholder rubber is the net area under the curve “Discounted benefit of SH rubber”; Cdamage 
is the summation of the (T-t’)-year NPV revenue gains (NPVT-t’) and t’-year administration cost Ct’ 
– the summation of the area between the dashed line) 
 
According to the recorded yearly production and management cost of small-holder rubber 
farms (Yi 2012), I developed the relations of productivity, cost and net present value (NPV) 
of small-holder rubber over its lifespan, respectively.  
 
Production curve of small-holder rubber farms in XB 
Under different management regimes, the life span of small-holder rubber farms is shorter 
than state farms (35 years’ rotation cycle), and so is their latex production. Generally, 
small-holder rubber in XB matures after 8 years and timber is harvested in the 25
th 
year 
(Fig.2.6). During the latex-tapping period, its productivity increases smoothly from beginning, 
peaks around the 17
th
 year and decreases slowly until timber harvest (Fig. 2.7). The relation 
between rubber yield (y) and age (x) follows Equation 3: 
Y= -13.305 X
2 




Fig.2.6 The growing stage of rubber 
 
Fig.2.7 Production curve of smallholder rubber farms in XB (Yi 2012) 
 
As the local average price of rubber latex in XB is US$ 3.4/kg, farmers’ revenue from latex 
(R(latex)t) is in accordance with latex production as:  
Revenue (USD/ha) = rubber yield (kg/ha)* 3.4(USD/kg) (Yi 2012) 
Cost of small-holder rubber plantation administration  
Ct is the annual cost of farmers related to plantation set up, tending, administration, 
transportation, tax, and labor. In the rotation cycle of rubber, Ct overall includes two parts: 
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establishment (or replanting) of plantations and successive management (Fig.2.8). In 
particular, after land preparation in the 1
st
 year, cost climbs considerably at year 2 when 
substantial investment is required to purchase rubber seedlings, construct roads and conduct 
planting. After setting up the plantations, cost decreases until year 7. During this period, 
tending of the young farm is rubber holder’s main focus. Afterwards, the cost goes much 
higher when latex tapping begins, which includes installation of latex-collecting equipment 
and tools, latex transportations, and management regarding weeding, fertilizing and 
phytosanitary measures. Overall, Ct increases with latex production that demands 
administration efforts and labor input.    
 
Fig.2.8 Administraion cost of smallholder rubber farms in XB (Yi 2012) 
 
NPV of small-holder rubber farms  
Discounted benefit (y) is the net revenue gains (revenue minus cost) and follows the 






+820.88X -2929.2                                             (4) 
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Before latex tapping, the net revenue (so as NPV) is negative. After the 8
th
 year, it turns 
positive and increases gradually, peaks at the 17
th
 year and decreases until the end of rotation 
cycle (Fig.2.9).  
 
Fig.2.9 Discounted benefit and NPV of smallholder rubber farms in XB (Yi 2012) 
 
Cdamage and environmental factors 
NPV (So as Cdamage) varies in XB because rubber productivity is also determined by an array 
of environmental factors: species, direct solar radiation, slope, temperature, rainfall and soils. 
Covering a small geographic range, it was assumed that microclimate in Shangyong PA did 
not vary and only the influence of elevation on rubber productivity was considered. In 
general, elevation is negatively correlated with rubber productivity and it contributes to 
considerable NPV variation in XB (Yi 2012). Shangyong PA is mountainous with the highest 
hills over 2000 meters (Figure 2.10), and its surrounding forestry lands are largely covered by 
monoculture rubber farms. Relatively, villages to the west PA are located in a flatter and 
lower region with a latitude less than 823 meters, whist the topography of villages on the 




Elevation information was collected by GPS at a range of HEC locations so that site-specific 
spatial information could be integrated into rubber value calculation and to estimate a 
virtually economic cost of rubber damage in each village. Yi (2011) modeled the spatially 
explicit NPV across XB including 820 field points of small-holder rubber, which indicated 
the regression relationship between NPV and geographical location. Based on the elevation 
and annual NPV of these 820 points, I used linear regression to build the relationship between 
Cdamage and the age of rubber attacked at a specific elevation as Equation 5: 
Cost ($/Ha) = 2607.351 + 1810.583 age - 3.638 elevation (R
2
 = 0.644)                (5) 
Where all the estimated parameters were significant (Table 2.1) 




Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) 2607.351 160.553 
 
16.240 .000 
Age 1810.583 24.693 .780 73.323 .000 
Elevation -3.638 .205 -.189 -17.779 .000 
 
In this equation, weighted-average age was used to represent the age of trees attacked at each 
village, and cost was calculated based on the mean elevation of HEC locations. Finally, each 
village within the elephant range had a value to represent the cost of rubber ($/Ha) inflicted 
by wild elephants in 2011. In XB, principally, every 33 individual rubber were planted in 1 
Mu (China’s rural land unit; 1 Mu = 0.067 Ha), and I further calculated the cost at tree level 




Fig.2.10 Elevation variations of Shangyong PA and its surroundings  
 
Calculation of the annual payout for rubber damage (guidance of minimum insurance 
premium setting)  
Assuming insurance guarantees full payment, the annual payout for the unit rubber land 
(hectare) at the village level is calculated as: 
Payout ($/Ha) = rubber mortality * cost of damage (Cdamage) 
Where rubber mortality is the ratio of the total rubber death in 2011 to the total holding 
rubber of all the interviewed households from the each village 
Additionally, funds adequate to rubber compensation at the town level are calculated by 




“Elephants Valley” (EV) is a famous tourist attraction in XB and tourists frequent the region 
to see and experience elephants in the wild. As one major group of the beneficiaries of wild 
elephants, tourists’ WTP for elephant conservation was surveyed in EV. A total of 210 
tourists were interviewed. Principally, a tourist passing by at every 10-min time point was 
selected for interview. The information solicited included socio-demographic factors (age, 
gender, job types, education, and origin), acknowledgement of HEC, suggestions for 
mitigation methods for HEC and WTP for elephant conservation. 
 
Data analysis 








Fig.2.12 Flow diagram of methods adopted in investigating a cost-sharing insurance scheme to 
mitigate HEC in Xishuangbanna 
 
Binary logistic regression (method: Backward-Wald) was used to test the relationship 
between farmers’ susceptibility to elephant attack and the crops they grow. This regression 
model can identify signiﬁcant variables affecting the log odds-ratio in binary variables such 
as presence/absence (Sitati, Walpole and Leader-Williams 2005). Specifically, farmers were 
coded as raided (1) and non-raided (0) based on their experiences in the past five years, and 
the presence of raiding experience with physical traits (area of each cropland and number of 
years the farmer has lived in this region) was tested by regression. The entry and exit of 
covariates were specified by the Wald statistic for stepwise with probabilities of 0.05 and 0.1. 
In addition, Binary Logistic Regression was also adopted to investigate WTP of farmers and 
explore the variables determining respondents’ answers. Farmers were grouped into two 
categories: willing (1) and unwilling /unsure (0) to pay for insurance premium, and their 
WTP with socio-demographical variables and rubber mortality were tested by regression.  
I used machine learning methods known as Conditional Inference Trees (CIT) and forests 
(CIF) to identify variables shaping farmer’s perception (ordinal response). CIT and CIF are 
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recursive partitioning techniques dealing with nonlinear interactions as well as higher order 
interactions (i.e. trait synergisms) in predicting the outcome (Giam et al. 2011). CIT and CIF 
were implemented using the package “party” (Hothorn et al. 2011). Specifically, CIT is a 
nonparametric technique that employs a statistical stopping criterion to split a data set into 
binary groups repeatedly based on the association between covariates and response, until the 
recursion needs to stop and generate an optimal decision tree (Hothorn, Hornik and Zeileis 
2006, Giam et al. 2011). This tree-structure based model is applicable to all kinds of 
regression problems including ordinal response (Hothorn et al. 2011). CIT also excludes 
colinearity between covariates and only the covariate with highest association is selected for 
splitting (Hothorn et al. 2006). To explore potential trends of more variables, I set Monte 
Carlo P <0.10 for tree models. 
Based on conditional inference trees, CIF provides an implementation of Breiman’s random 
forests which combines the predictions from many individual trees to generate robust and 
unbiased predictions (Giam et al. 2011, Hothorn et al. 2011). This nonlinear and 
nonparametric random forest method provides variable importance measures for variable 
selection purposes (Strobl et al. 2007). To determine the relative importance of predictor 
variables in shaping farmer’s perception, I constructed every CIF of 10,000 trees and 
computed the conditional permutation importance value of each variable.  
Villages were then categorized into groups based on their geographic locations, conflict 
levels and scale of rubber plantations, and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney and the Kruskal 
Wallis tests were used respectively to examine whether those attitudinal differences towards 
elephant conservation and insurance are significantly evident among designated groups. Both 
these tests don’t require that the dependent variable is a normally distributed interval variable 
(Bruin 2006). The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is a non-parametric analog to the 
independent samples t-test that is used to compare the means of the dependent variable 
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(perception) for two independent groups, and the Kruskal Wallis test permits the test for 
difference among two or more groups. It is the non-parametric version of ANOVA and a 





















Chapter 3 ResultsⅠ – Socio-ecological factors determining farmers’ 
perceptions towards the conservation of wild elephant in China 
Crop composition of 11 villages in XB 
In 2011, I surveyed farmers’ perceptions through 11 villages of Mengyang and Shangyong PA. 
These villages differed in geographic locations, ethnicity, HEC intensity and livelihoods 
(Table 3.1).  Mean area of different crops in each village was calculated individually 
(Fig.3.1). In general, villages from Shangyong PA mainly rely on rubber, and those from 
Mengyang are planting both rubber and tea. Only two villages (Konggeliudui and 
zhongtianba) to the east Mengyang harvest rubber latex, while other tea-planted villages to 
the west have just started to grow rubber and their current main income is from tea. 
Small-scale rice and corn are also cultivated in these 11 villages for subsistence and to feed 
the livestock, and a few farmers also grow other types of cash crop like banana in Shangyong 



















Fig.3.1 Crop composition in each village  
Data was collected from the household survey; crop area in this figure is based on the mean area of 
each crop type of interviewed households from same village 
 
Crop type and farmer’s HEC experience in the past five years 
Binary logistic regression model - Backward Stepwise (Wald) was used to identify physical 
traits that likely lead to farmer’s HEC experiences. Predicted variables were set as number of 
years a farmer has lived there and cultivated area of each crop (rubber, rice, corn, fruit, tea 















1 Shangzhongliang 700 Hani Shangyong High Rubber Latex tapping 
2 Manfen(Xia) 677 Dai Shangyong High Rubber Latex tapping 
3 Manfen(Shang) 640 Dai Shangyong High Rubber Latex tapping 
4 Nanmuhe 924 Bulang Mengyang West None to Low Tea Sapling 
5 Dadangtian 816 Handai Mengyang West None to Low Others Sapling 
6 Kunhanxiaozhai 1097 Bulang Mengyang West None to Low Tea Not grown 
7 Kunhandazhai 979 Bulang Mengyang West None to Low Tea Not grown 
8 Mannuo 989 Dai Mengyang West Low Tea Sapling 
9 Mengman 965 Dai Mengyang West Low Tea Sapling 
10 Konggeliudui 924 Hani Mengyang East High Rubber, Tea  Latex tapping 
11 Zhongtianba 953 Jinuo,Han Mengyang East High Rubber, Tea Latex tapping 
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in the past five years. The results showed that rubber was the most significant variable 
leading to farmers' raiding experiences, and the larger the area of rubber, the more likely the 
farmer had problems with elephants. Additionally, those farmers living a longer time in the 
same region would have more experiences of elephant crop-raiding（Table3.2）. 
Variables entered: living years, rubber, tea, corn, rice, fruit, others  
 
The Conditional Inference Tree (CIT) model further depicted that over 95% of the farmers 
with rubber plantations over 0.67 ha had reported HEC in the past 5 years; and those with 
small-scale rubber plantations (<0.67 ha) or no rubber plantations had only 50% probability 
being raided by elephants (Fig.3.2). 
 
 
Fig.3.2 CIT model to predict crop types determining farmer’s crop-raiding experiences  
Table 3.2 Binary logistic regression model to predict farmers’ HEC experiences 
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp (B) 
Living Years .029 .014 4.040 1 .044 1.029 
Rubber .651 .157 17.263 1 .000 1.918 
Constant -.661 .490 1.817 1 .178 .516 
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Perceived livelihood obstacles by farmers 
70% of respondents pointed to crop-raiding animals as the main life obstacles, followed by 
infrastructure (40%) and water availability (37%) (Fig.3.3a). I further categorized these 
villages into three groups based on their geographical distribution in PAs (Fig.2.12) and the 
results revealed that animals were perceived as the biggest obstacle to livelihoods (more than 
95% of respondents) by communities from Shangyong PA and East Mengyang. These two 
groups were common in large-scale rubber plantations, high economic dependence on latex 
tapping and frequent HEC reporting, while only around 40% of farmers in west Mengyang 
perceived elephants as the main obstacle and water deficiency was the biggest problem most 
people cared about (Fig.3.3b). 
(a) 
(b) 
Fig.3.3 Percieved life obstacles by farmers 
(a) Perceived life obstacles by all farmers;  (b) Perceived life obstacles among groups 
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Perceived cultivation problem by farmers 
Animals (77%), water (38%) and disease (30%) were the top three problems to cultivation 
according to farmers’ perception (Fig.3.4a), and specifically, these perceived problems among 
groups were the same as the responses given for life obstacles (Fig.3.4b). Animals were also 








Fig.3.4 Perceived problems to cultivation by farmers 
(a) Perceived problems to cultivation by all farmers; (b) Perceived problems to cultivation among 
groups 
 
Perceived top agriculture pests by farmers  
Overall, 80% of the respondents perceived elephants as the main crop pest, followed by 
murine and wild boar (Fig.3.5a), and they were the primary crop-raider ranked by all groups 
(Fig.3.5b). Specifically, every farmer from Shangyong and East Mengyang marked elephants 





Fig.3.5 Perceived pest animals by farmers 
(a) Perceived pest animals by all farmers; (b) Perceived pest animals among groups 
 
 
Perceived threats from wild elephants and farmer’s experience in the past five years  
Crop-raiding, safety and property damage were perceived to be the top three threats from 
wild elephants, which were in accordance with households’ past experiences (Fig.3.6). In the 
last 5 years, 146 over 188 farmers reported elephant crop-raiding, 153 worried about safety 
and stated their fear to go out during the evening, and 57 reported property damage manifest 
as attacks to work shed in rubber plantations. Additionally, attacks on human and livestock 





Fig.3.6 Perceived threats from wild elephants and farmers’ previous experiences 
Factors determining farmers’ perceptions towards wild elephant conservation in China 
(CIT&CIF models) 
How do you perceive elephants as a problem? 
As illustrated in the Conditional Inference Tree (CIT) model (Fig.3.7a), villages 1, 2, 3 
(Shangyong PA), 10 and 11 (East Mengyang PA) are the ones reporting the highest HEC 
intensity and cultivating rubber plantations at the largest scale. Almost all of the farmers 
(90%) I interviewed from these villages treated elephants as a big problem to their lives and 
livelihoods. On the other hand, in the other villages, those farmers who had experienced 
elephant crop raiding in the past 5 years (experience = 1, raided) treated elephants as a 
problem to different extents, and this was probably according to their economic loss. 
However, less than one third of them thought of elephants as a big problem, and more than 
half ranked them as a small problem or no negative influence on their daily life. Among the 
farmers not being raided (experience = 0, non-raided), they perceived elephants more 
positively as either a small or not a problem. Specifically, 50% of farmers growing more 
rice > 0.8 ha ranked elephants as a small problem while about all the farmers with smaller 
rice field did not regard elephants as a problem. As a palatable cultivar for elephants, rice is 
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most commonly raided in elephant ranges. Therefore, high availability of rice may inflict 
higher risk of crop-raiding, especially for these villages resident inside Mengyang PA and 
surrounded by natural forests. Additionally, despite crop damage, this “problem” also refers 
to worries for safety and restriction of activities in the evening.  
 
Conditional Inference Forest (CIF) model further evaluated significance of each predictor by 
Variable Importance, following the permutation principle of the ‘mean decrease in accuracy’ 
importance in ‘Random Forest’, and the conditional permutation variable importance score 
refers to the variable’s contribution to the CIF model’ classification accuracy. A positive score 
means a reduction in the accuracy of the model if this test variable is permutated, suggesting 
this variable is predictive of farmer’s response, whilst 0 and negative score refer to no 
negligible changes to the classification accuracy. Experience, village, ethnicity, economic loss 
and rice were the five top significant factors in the CIF model that shaped farmers’ 
perceptions (Table 3.3). Among these factors, ethnicity was highly correlated with villages 
and so was loss and experience. As CIT excludes co-linearity among predictor variables and 
only the more significant one is present on the tree, these two variables were shown as 
predictive in CIF but not CIT. Overall, the results from CIT and CIF were consistent. 
   
Fig.3.7 (a) CIT model of farmer’s perception towards elephant as a problem 
Answers: 
1: Big 
2: Average   




Table 3.3 CIFs of farmer’ perceptions towards elephant and current insurance scheme (Conditional 
permutation variable importance score of predictor variables) 
 





decrease of elephant no. 
Perception towards current 
insurance scheme 










0.057 Rubber 0.009 Ethnicity 0.009 Village 0.023 
2 Village 0.040 Ethnicity 0.003 Age 0.007 Problem 0.015 
3 Ethnicity 0.010 Problem 0.002 Conservati
on 
0.002 Loss 0.009 
4 Loss 0.007 Village 0.002 Gender 0.001 Tea 0.005 
5 Rice 0.002 Gender 0.001 Other 
Income 
0.001 Ethnicity 0.002 
6 Living 
Years 
0.001 Fruit 0.000 Rubber 0.001 Rubber 0.002 





0.000 Land area 0.000 Others 0.001 
9 Tea 0.000 Land area 0.000 Family 
Size 
0.000 Rice 0.001 
10 Other 
Income 
0.000 Others 0.000 Village 0.000 Land area 0.001 
11 Fruit 0.000 Tea 0.000 Living 
Years 
0.000 Decrease 0.001 
12 Education 0.000 Age 0.000 Fruit 0.000 Experience 0.001 
13 Corn 0.000 Loss 0.000 Corn 0.000 Family Size 0.000 
14 Gender 0.000 Education 0.000 Education 0.000 Age 0.000 
15 Age 0.000 Rice 0.000 Tea 0.000 Education 0.000 
16 Others 0.000 Corn 0.000 Experience 0.000 Fruit 0.000 
17 Land area 0.000 Living 
Years 
-0.001 Others -0.001 Living Years 0.000 
18   Family Size -0.001 Loss -0.001 Gender 0.000 
19     Rice -0.001 Corn 0.000 
20       Conservation 0.000 
(Noted that response variable “Problem” was used as independent variable to predict “Conservation”, so as 
“Problem” and “Conservation” to predict “Decrease of elephant no.” and these three responses to predict 
perceptions towards “Insurance”.) 
 
How do you perceive elephant conservation propaganda? 
CIT model (Fig.3.7 b) indicated that the land holding size of rubber was the most significant 
variable (P = 0.001) determining farmer’s perception. Specifically, farmers with large rubber 
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plantations over 2.93ha were more inclined to perceive conservation negatively (answer1), or 
they would only support conservation if economic loss got compensated or damage was 
thoroughly extirpated. Among those smaller rubber holders (≤2.93ha), ethnicity became the 
predictor of attitudinal differences (P = 0.044). Hani (1) and Handai (4) people were more 
likely to oppose conservation propaganda. They are mainly farmers living inside Mengyang 
PA. Like big rubber plantation holders, economically, these farmers also cultivate rubber 
most albeit at a smaller scale due to strict restrictions on farming in the PAs. However, among 
other ethnic groups, most tea farmers were generally supportive of conservation. In particular, 
farmers holding larger tea farms (> 0.4 ha, mainly Bulang people in Mengyang PA) had fewer 
negative answers towards conservation than those smaller holders, but a higher proportion of 
them supported conservation conditionally (answer4). This may be due to rising probabilities 
of HEC with increasing farming area and human-elephant encounter opportunity. Although 
land area of tea was not significant in the CIT model (P = 0.085 on CIT), it showed an 
attitudinal trend among tea farmers. 
 
Ethnicity— 1: Hani; 2: Dai; 3: Bulang; 4: Handai; 5: Jinuo; 6: Han 
Fig.3.7 (b) CIT model of farmer’s perception towards elephant conservation propaganda  
  
In keeping with CIT, CIF pointed rubber and ethnicity as the most significant variables 
predicting attitudinal response while tea was not significant (Table.3.3). As correlated with 
Answers 1 to 5: 
1: Negative/opposed attitudes 
2: Don’t know; indifferent;  
3: Neutral 
4: Support but with conditions  
(Compensation; if no damage)  




ethnicity, problem as elephants and village were listed in this CIF model, and gender was also 
shown to exert minor influence on perceptions.    
 
What would you think if the current number of elephant population reduces by half? 
Generally, 128 out of 188 respondents were in favor of either a reduction of elephant numbers 
or extirpation of their population, but 45 households argued against these opinions and stated 
the importance of conserving wild elephants that were endangered. Ethnicity played a 
significant role (P = 0.004) in shaping the divergence of views (Fig.3.7c). Although 40% Dai, 
Handai and Bulang people favored the decrease of current elephant numbers (Answer3), 
more than 30% of them (about 40 people) supported conservation (Answer5), which 
accounted for the biggest percentage of positive answers. Simultaneously, the lowest 
proportion of people in this category favored the eradication of wild elephants compared with 
other ethnicities. However, among Hani, Jinuo and Han people, most farmers with rubber 
plantations over 0.67 ha tended to hold negative attitudes, and even as many as half of them 
stated a preference to extirpate elephants in wild. On the contrary, among 7 households with 








Ethnicity— 1: Hani; 2: Dai; 3: Bulang; 4: Handai; 5: Jinuo; 6: Han 
Fig.3.7(c) CIT model of farmer’s perception towards decrease of elephant number 
 
1: It’s better to extirpate all the 
elephants in China 
2: It’s better to extirpate all the 
elephants in farming areas 
3: It’s better to decrease the number 
of elephant population in this region, 
but elephants cannot go extinct 
4: Neutral, don’t know 
5: The number of elephants cannot 




Ethnicity was the most important predictor in both CIT and CIF models (Table.3.3). In 
addition, age was significant with a correlation with ethnicity (Fig.3.7d) present on CIF. 
Respondents from Dai, Bulang and Handai villages were generally younger than those from 
other ethnic groups, and there was a split at the age of 40. Perceptions to conservation, gender 
of the farmer, other income source or not, rubber holding area, and problem as elephants were 
also slightly predictive of responses.   
 
Fig.3.7 (d) Normal distribution of age by ethnicity 
 
Methods adopted to mitigate HEC and perceived solutions by farmers in the future 
Locally, deterrents (64%) were most commonly used to scare elephants away (Fig.3.8a). 
Despite deterrents, 33% of farmers stated no measures were currently taken to prevent 
elephant damage due to the ineffectiveness of traditional methods and habituation to 
deterrents by wild elephants, and 17% of farmers abandoned croplands of rice and corn and 
turned to other livelihoods. A barrier (elephant trench) was also constructed around 
Shangyong PA performing as a mitigation method in that area.  
 
For suggestions regarding farmers’ perspectives, around 65% of them believed that prior 
importance should be attached to compensation to solve HEC in the future, followed by 
building barriers and developing alternative livelihoods (Fig.3.8b). However, 87% of farmers 
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thought it was the governments’ responsibility to mitigate HEC, and only 10% recognized 
that farmers and communities should be also involved into solving the problem. Additionally, 
around 15% of respondents turned to the insurance company that was perceived to be 
responsible for HEC, and this group was made up of people who had received crop 
compensation from the insurance company recently.  
 
Specifically, I categorized farmers’ suggestions on mitigation methods based on village 
locations. Most farmers from Shangyong prioritized prevention method – barrier that was 
related to their previous experiences. Initially, the elephant trench was effective in the 
avoidance of damage in this region but it collapsed and lost its effectiveness due to poor 
maintenance. Generally, despite different suggestions from these areas, most farmers 
expected a fair compensation (Fig.3.8c and Table.3.4) and there was still a proportion of 









Fig. 3.8 Current HEC mitigation method and future suggestions 
(a) HEC mitigation methods used by farmers; (b) Suggestions of future HEC solutions by farmers; 




























1 10 3 9 42 3 23 14 0 9 2 115 
2 8 3 7 30 4 73 2 2 13 10 152 
3 1 3 1 18 2 25 13 11 8 0 82 
Total 19 9 17 90 9 121 29 13 30 12 349 
 
Farmer’s perception towards current insurance compensation 
Despite technical measures to mitigate HEC, government- sponsored compensation attempted 
to increase local tolerance through economic incentives. The wildlife department was 
responsible for compensation before 2010, and afterwards, an insurance company was 
involved in damage verification and payment. I investigated farmers’ perceptions towards the 
current insurance scheme and the underlying factors, compared with the previous 
state-initiated scheme. 
 
Attitudinal differences were significant among villages (Fig.3.9). Villages Nanmuhe, 
Kunhanxiaozhai, Kunhandazhai and Mannuo to the west Mengyang PA had low or no HEC 
reporting in the past five years (Table.3.1). Without dealings with insurance, most farmers 
responded “don’t know” or “cannot make an adjustment without experiences”; while villages 
in Shangyong (Shangzhongliang and Mengfen-Shang) responded most negatively that the 
insurance company was much worse than the wildlife department regarding efficiency, 
fairness and compensation value. The other five villages ranked insurance differently ranging 




Corresponding to CIT results, CIF indicated that village was the most significant predictor. In 
addition, villages differed in and characterized by traits as elephant as a problem, loss, tea, 
rubber and ethnicity, so these variables highly correlated to village were also present in CIF 
model.    
 
Fig.3.9 CIT model of farmer’s perception towards current insurance scheme  
 
Attitudinal difference test 
Attitudinal differences among groups at different geographical locations 
Farmers’ perceptions towards elephant conservation (measured by three questions) and 
insurance scheme differed significantly (P= 0.000) among three groups (Table 3.5a). A larger 
(or smaller) mean rank of answers (ordinal variables) represented a more positive (or 
negative) attitude in the group. Generally, Villages in west Mengyang showed the most 
positive attitudes towards conservation. They ranked elephants as the least problem in life, 
they supported conservation propaganda most, and they opposed a decrease in elephant 
number. For insurance, villages in east Mengyang treated it most positively as a better way to 
alleviate economic loss while Shangyong perceived it most negatively.  
 
1: Unsatisfied, worse than before 
2: Don’t know, indifferent 
3: Same as the wildlife department;  
No better changes 
4: Better than before, but insurance has 
many shortcomings 




Table 3.5 (a) Kruskal Wallis Test of attitudinal differences among geographical groups 








Group N Mean                           Rank 
Shangyong 62 59.61 70.06 90.49 68.39 
Mengyang West 93 132.57 116.65 109.4 98.46 
Mengyang East 33 52.76 77.98 60.05 132.39 
Test Statistics 
Chi-Square 108.998 33.795 22.127 33.278 
df 2 2 2 2 
Asymp. 
P-value 
.000 .000 .000 .000 
 
Additionally, the Mann-Whitney Test showed significant attitudinal difference between group 
Mengyang West and every other two groups towards all questions (Table.3.5b). However, for 
the test between Shangyong and Mengyang East where HEC were intense, farmers from both 
groups perceived elephants as a big problem and opposed conservation propaganda (present 
in statistics significance P > 0.05), but they held distinctly different opinions on the decrease 
of elephant number (P = 0.006) and insurance scheme (P = 0.000).   
Table 3.5(b) Mann-Whitney Test of attitudinal differences among geographical groups 
Group Test Statistics Elephants as 
problem 







Mann-Whitney U 633.5 1461 2297.5 1856 
Wilcoxon W 2586.5 3414 4250.5 3809 
Z -8.736 -5.454 -2.226 -3.961 
Asymp. P-value 
(2-tailed) 




Mann-Whitney U 936.5 930 686 431 
Wilcoxon W 1497.5 2883 1247 2384 
Z -1.404 -0.752 -2.757 -4.927 
Asymp. P-value 
(2-tailed) 





Mann-Whitney U 243.5 896.5 734.5 876 
Wilcoxon W 804.5 1457.5 1295.5 5247 
Z -7.519 -3.799 -4.599 -3.875 
Asymp. P-value 
(2-tailed) 




Attitudinal difference between high HEC and low/none HEC regions 
I further categorized villages into a high-conflict group and a low/none-conflict group and 
tested attitudinal difference using a Mann-Whitney Test. The results showed that the 
high-HEC group held dramatically more negative perceptions towards wild elephant 
conservation (P=0.000), but there was no significantly statistic difference among perceptions 
towards insurance scheme (P = 0.304). 
 
Table 3.6 Mann-Whitney Test of attitudinal difference between groups at different HEC level 







Group N Mean  Rank 
High HEC 95 57.23 72.82 79.92 90.62 
Low/none HEC 93 132.57 116.65 109.40 98.46 
Test Statistics 
Mann-Whitney U 877.000 2357.500 3032.000 4049.000 
Wilcoxon W 5437.000 6917.500 7592.000 8609.000 
Z -10.420 -5.770 -3.855 -1.027 
Asymp. P-value 
(2-tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 .304 
 
Attitudinal difference based on rubber plantation scale and stage of rubber latex harvest 
The eleven villages were divided into three categories based on the growing stage of rubber 
plantations and latex harvest: farmers holding large-scale mature rubber plantations and 
dependent on latex tapping for livelihoods; farmers planting early-stage rubber saplings at 
small-scale and not yet gaining income from latex yield; farmers with no rubber plantations 
(Refer to Table.3.1). The Kruskal Wallis Test showed that farmers’ positive responds to all 
questions increased with their holding scale and economic dependence on rubber decreasing, 
and their attitudinal differences towards conservation were significant at statistic level (P = 





Table 3.7(a) Kruskal Wallis Test of attitudinal differences at different rubber scale 







Group N Mean  Rank 
Mature rubber 95 57.23 72.82 79.92 90.62 
Early-stage rubber 57 119.82 109.85 102.49 97.79 
No rubber 36 152.75 127.42 120.33 99.53 
Test Statistics 
Chi-Square 118.323 35.807 17.419 1.080 
df 2 2 2 2 
Asymp. P-value .000 .000 .000 .583 
 
I compared attitudes between every two groups (Table.3.9). Significantly, both non-rubber 
and early-stage rubber farmers favored conservation more than mature- rubber holders (P = 
0.000). Additionally, non-rubber farmers ranked wild elephants as a smaller problem than 
early-stage rubber farmers, and they supported conservation propaganda more, but 
perceptions towards diminishing elephant number did not differ significantly between these 
two groups. Generally, no significant differences were found among farmers’ perspectives of 
insurance scheme.  
Table 3.7(b) Mann-Whitney Test of attitudinal difference at different rubber scale 
Group Test Statistics Elephants as 
problem 







Mann-Whitney U 784.000 1598.500 2053.500 2489.500 
Wilcoxon W 5344.000 6158.500 6613.500 7049.500 
Z -8.683 -4.372 -2.587 -.863 
Asymp. P-value 
(2-tailed) 





Mann-Whitney U 93.000 759.000 978.500 1559.500 
Wilcoxon W 4653.000 5319.000 5538.500 6119.500 
Z -10.042 -5.094 -3.919 -.805 
Asymp. P-value 
(2-tailed) 





Mann-Whitney U 546.000 792.000 827.500 995.500 
Wilcoxon W 2199.000 2445.000 2480.500 2648.500 
Z -4.017 -2.050 -1.637 -.273 
Asymp. P-value 
(2-tailed) 




Chapter 4 ResultsⅡ– Adopting a spatially explicit insurance scheme to 
mitigate HEC in China 
Focusing on rubber compensation, this study conducted in 2012 further evaluated the 
effectiveness of the current insurance scheme and tested an alternative payment mechanism 
in Shangyong PA.  
 
Conflict areas 
There are two main elephant populations ranging through Shangyong PA and its surroundings. 
Specifically, the population in the west is a habitual crop raider that has inflicted continuous 
economic loss and incurred intense conflicts with rural villagers at the PA boundary. For the 
other population to the east of the PA, elephants range eastwards and away from Shangyong 
after 2009, and currently reside in the communities’ collective forests at the national border 
line of China and Laos. 
 
I surveyed 26 villages (Fig.2.1.b3). Fourteen of them, mostly bordering the east Shangyong, 
reported “no elephant disturbance” since 2010, and the other 12 reported “Yes”. Respectively, 
these “Yes” HEC villages are: to the west – Shangzhongliang, Manfen (village Shang and 
Xia), Nanping, Hetu, Hongxingdui, Xiazhongliang and Dashujiao; to the east – Dongyang, 
Xiaolongha, Zhongnanxi and NanxiXincun (Conflict centers of rubber damage were shown 




Mortality of rubber by elephant attack in 2011 (Spatial risk distribution)  
Through the questionnaire survey, data was collected on the number and age of rubber trees 
owned by the household and the number of rubber lost to elephant attack in 2011. Rubber 
mortality of each village was then used to represent this village’s risk exposed to elephant 
attack (Table 4.1). Among villages, conflicts were unevenly distributed and risk varied 
considerably. Nanping showed the highest rubber mortality (7.01%, every 7 of 100 rubber 
trees were attacked), followed by Shangzhongliang, Manfen and Hetu. These villages are all 
located in Mengman town which reported the highest HEC. On the other hand, villages to the 
east underwent rather lower damage. Including all villages, the mean rubber mortality was 
2.58%.  
 
I mapped the risk gradients (Fig.4.1) based on the rubber mortality of each village. In the 
west, there was a HEC gradient centering on Nanping village and radiating outwards. Risk 
decreases with the increasing proximity to the PA. To the east PA, there was another conflict 
hotspot in Nanxi Xincun whose forestry lands were bordering Laos. The elephants in the east 
were historically resident inside Shangyong and inflicted conflicts with adjacent villages. 
However, this risk gradient revealed a recent eastward movement of HEC from the PA border. 
Additionally, this risk map also depicted the scale of elephant range and their activity 
frequency represented by the intensity of damage, which fitted the historical monitoring 
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records of wild elephant movement in Shangyong (Shangyong Wildlife Department, 2011). 
 
Fig.4.1 Risk map of rubber attack by wild elephants in Shangyong PA 
Risk map shows conflicts centers, risk gradients and mortality of rubber (Risk index) in each village 
incurred by wild elephants in the year 2011 
 
Compensation received from insurance company 
Based on the number of trees lost to elephant attack stated by households and the actual 
number claimed by insurance company, I calculated the percentage of rubber number 
compensated (compensation ratio in Table 4.1). Only Hetu and Xiaolongha claimed rubber 
damage successfully with a compensation ratio > 50%, whilst 6 villages received a payment 
< 10% including 3 villages with 0%. These villages complained that little damage was 


















Shangzhongliang 6.04% 3.39 47.80% 5624.13  11.36  339.71  
Manfen (Shang) 5.50% 2.19 4.95% 3773.81  7.62  207.56  
Manfen (Xia) 3.61% 2.22 2.51% 3773.81  7.62  136.23  
Hetu 2.08% 2.69 68.34% 4449.60  8.99  92.38  
Nanping 7.01% 2.55 9.21% 4388.17  8.86  307.45  
Hongxingdui 0.72% 2.83 16.88% 4801.56  9.70  34.60  
Xiazhongliang 0.44% 3.24 0.00% 5886.71  11.89  26.19  
Dongyang 0.68% 3.96 32.84% 7224.71  14.60  48.82  
Xiaolongha 1.02% 2.15 79.02% 3499.92  7.07  35.85  
Zhongnanxi 0.01% 2.00 0.00% 6881.67  13.90  0.38  
Dashujiao 0.51% 4.28 0.00% 7831.44  15.82  39.78  
NanxiXincun 1.56% 4.16 31.22% 6881.67  13.90  107.11  
 
Age-associated risk of elephant attack 
It generally takes 8 years in XB for rubber latex tapping. Before trees get mature, tender 
seedlings and saplings less than 5-year old were most vulnerable to elephant attacks. 
Especially in some villages, rubber holders intercrop young plantations with maize and rice, 
which increases the risk of crop raiding and rubber mortality.  
 
Based on the household survey data, I summed the number of rubber owned by farmers 
separately according to age and calculated the percentage to show the age composition of 
rubber plantations (Fig.4.2). In the same way, the percentage of rubber lost to elephant in 
2011 was calculated to show the age-associated risk of elephant attack (Fig.4.2). Among the 
208 households, 47% of their rubber farms were young plantations (<=8yr) with high 
mortality, and the other 53% were mature plantations (>8yr) with the lowest damage 
reporting. In specific, among the total 13,071 attacked trees, about 92% were younger than 5 
years, and only less than 1% were adult trees older than 8-year old. In addition, the weighted 
average age of the attacked rubber was calculated at the village level. The overall mean age 
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was 2.86 years and varied slightly among villages because the individual rubber plantations 
were established at different periods (weighted average age in Table 4.1). 
 
Fig.4.2 The age composition of rubber farms and the age of rubber attacked by wild elephants 
 
Cost of rubber damage (Cdamage) 
Locations of rubber attack were recorded and it was found that rubber farms adjacent to 
natural forests bore the biggest risk to elephant attack, and generally, most plantations 
attacked were at the height ranging from 600 to 950 meters. Based on Equation 5, the 
site-specific cost of rubber damage (Cdamage/Ha and Cdamage/Tree) was calculated for each 
village considering the age (weighted average age in Table 4.1) and location (mean elevation 
of HEC incidents) of rubber attacked.  
 
Overall, the actual cost to repair damage was about 3 to 7 times higher than the current 
standard insurance payment – $2/Tree. Specifically, Dashujiao and Dongyang bore the 
biggest cost per tree ($15- $16) due to the most loss of delaying NPV (NPV T-t’). The young 
rubber plantations attacked in these villages were generally older (t’≈4) as their farms had 
few HEC incidents prior to 2010, and replanted young plantations accounted for a small 
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proportion. On the contrary, in the high-conflict villages like Nanping, farmers continuously 
underwent rubber loss and had to yearly replant new seedlings that were once again 
vulnerable to attack and therefore stuck in a vicious circle. Mostly, trees attacked in 
high-HEC villages were less than 3 years old associated with a relatively smaller loss of 
NPVT-t’.   
  
Expected annual payout of rubber damage  
Expected payout at the village level 
Assuming farmers would be fully compensated, I calculated the annual payout ($/Ha) to 
cover rubber cost for each village separately by multiplying the probability of elephant 
depredation (Rubber mortality in Table 4.1) and the cost to repair damage (Cdamage/Ha in 
Table 4.1). Similar to risk (Fig.4.1), expected rubber payout was much higher in villages from 
Mengman town where the intense HEC centered (Table.4.1 and Fig.4.3). Especially, it was 
highest in Shangzhongliang and Nanping (> $300/ha) with the most intense HEC, and lowest 
in Zhongnanxi ($0.38/ha) where only 1 over every 10,000 tree was attacked in 2011. 
Additionally, based on the household number and the mean rubber holding size of the 
interviewed farmers, I calculated the total rubber area for each village (Land area in Table 
4.2). The expected annual payout at village level (Payout of Villages in Table 4.2) was 
subsequently calculated by multiplying the unit payout ($/Ha) and the total rubber area of 
each village. The total payout varied among villages ranging from $83 for Zhongnanxi to 




Fig.4.3 Payout of rubber damage in villages around Shangyong PA 
Payout map shows the amount of money (USD/ha) be paid at each village to cover the cost of rubber 
damage 
 
Expected payout at town level 
To estimate the amount of funds adequate to sustain the insurance payment scheme in 
Shangyong and to provide better monetary targets for the central authorities at a broad 
administration scale, I summed up the payouts of villages belonging to the same town and 
calculated the annual payout to cover rubber damage at the town level (Payout of Towns in 
Table 4.2). A total $0.5 million investment could insure rubber in the risky areas around 
Shangyong PA and fully compensate farmers’ loss; and the required payout for Mengman 
town would be up to 90% (about $0.47 million) of the total budget. However, besides 
Shangyong PA, it is noted that HEC also happens in another four towns: Mengyang, 




Table 4.2 Payout of rubber damage at village and town level 




















Shangzhongliang 136 339.71 14 721 244,931 
Mengman Manfen(shang) 127 207.56 29 430 89,251 
Manfen(xia) 95 136.23 48 352 47,953 
Hetu 131 92.38 14 476 43,973 
471,612 67,691 Nanping 23 307.45 60 130 39,969 
Hongxingdui 74 34.6 14 160 5,536 
Xiazhongliang 76 26.19 48 297 7,778 Mengpeng 
Dashujiao 17 39.78 10 35 1,392 9,171 9,628 
Dongyang 35 48.82 60 82 4,003 
Shangyong 
Xiaolongha 44 35.85 33 155 5,557 
Zhongnanxi 30 0.38 14 218 83 
27,744 17,004 
Nanxi Xincun 25 107.11 2 169 18,102 
 




Willingness to pay (WTP) for insurance premium of farmers 
The mean WTP of farmers was $28.57/Ha. Among 208 respondents, 39% of them (n=82) 
were not willing to pay for insurance. However, equally, 35% (n=72) were willing to pay as 
much as $24-48 /Ha, and 13.5% (n=28) even would like to pay for over $120 /ha (Fig.4.5).  
 
Fig4.5 Willingness to Pay of farmers for insurance premium (n=208) 
 
I also calculated the mean WTP of each village (Mean WTP of farmers in Table 4.2). It was 
highest in Nanping and Dong Yang (60$/Ha) and lowest in Nanxi Xincun ($2/Ha). Based on 
Binary Logistic Regression, number of rubber trees lost to elephant attack was found 
significant (P = 0.014) in determining farmers’ WTP for insurance (Table 4.3). Specifically, it 
depicted a positive correlation that the people who bore more cost incurred by elephants 
might be more inclined to buy insurance. On the other hand, age of respondents showed a 
slightly negative correlation with WTP, indicating that the older people seemed more likely to 
refuse insurance possibly due to the conservative.  
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To examine the contribution of farmers’ WTP to insurance premium if a sharing payment 
scheme was to be put forward, I additionally calculated the total WTP of farmers at the town 
level by multiplying the town’s rubber area (sum of rubber area of affected villages in the 
same town) and the mean WTP of farmers in this town (Table 4.2). WTP in Mengman town 
accounted for 14.4% of the total rubber payout ($67,691), and WTPs in Mengpeng and 
Shangyong contributed to 100% ($9,628) and 61% ($17,004) of the total town payouts 
respectively.  
Table 4.3 Binary Logistic Regression of Farmers’ WTP for insurance 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Age -0.028 0.015 3.551 1 0.059 0.973 
No. of rubber lost to elephant 0.005 0.002 6.011 1 0.014 1.005 
Constant 1.516 0.639 5.629 1 0.018 4.554 
Variables entered: village, age, gender, ethnicity, education, family size, labor availability, no. of 
rubber, no. of rubber lost to elephant and compensation ratio. Methods: Back Wald Stepwise  
 
Farmers’ perceptions towards insurance  
I examined farmers’ perceptions towards the current insurance scheme, and their responses 
ranked from the most negative (1) to the most positive (4) (Fig.4.6). Ordinal regression first 
showed that village and percentage of rubber damage claimed by insurance company 
(compensation ratio) were the determining factors influencing farmers’ satisfaction towards 
current insurance scheme (Table 4.4). In detail, as depicted in the CIT model (Fig.4.6), about 
85% of the farmers in villages 1 (Shangzhongliang), 2 (Manfen_Shang), 7 (Xiazhaongliang), 
11(Dashujiao) and 12 (Zhongnanxi) perceived negatively either “Current insurance is worse 
than before” or “Insurance does not bring any better change”, and it was noted that the latter 
three villages received no compensation in 2011; while in other villages, 80% of rubber 
holders who had received over 22% compensation perceived insurance positively as 
“Insurance helps us reduce loss effectively albeit with some shortcomings”; On the contrary, 
people's attitudes among those who got less reimbursement were equally positive and 
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1: Current is worse than before 
2: Insurance does not bring any 
better change 
3: Insurance help to reduce loss 
effectively albeit some 
shortcomings 
4: Fully satisfied with insurance; 
should advocate it to a large scale 
negative. However, only 3.8% (n=8) of the total 208 farmers were fully satisfied with the 
current insurance. Most complaints about “shortcomings” were unreasonable compensation 
(a fraction value of market price), inefficiency of damage verification, non-timely payment, 
and discounting of dead tree numbers, followed by rude service and unfairness. 
 




Wald df P-value 





Village 0.123 0.032 15.283 1 0 0.062 0.185 
Age 0.002 0.009 0.036 1 0.85 -0.017 0.02 
Gender 0.373 0.19 3.83 1 0.05 0 0.746 
Ethnicity -0.006 0.064 0.009 1 0.926 -0.132 0.12 
Education -0.05 0.135 0.135 1 0.713 -0.315 0.216 
Family Size -0.009 0.06 0.022 1 0.882 -0.126 0.109 
No. of Labors 0.108 0.081 1.787 1 0.181 -0.051 0.267 
Damage rubber % -1.476 1.387 1.132 1 0.287 -4.196 1.243 
Compensation 
Ratio % 
0.967 0.229 17.861 1 0 0.519 1.416 
 
 




Attitudinal/behavioral changes provided a high compensation 
Eighty two farmers (39.4%) stated no attitudinal changes (37.5%) or uncertainty (1.9%) 
towards elephants even if the compensation was substantially to increase. There were two 
perceptions here: “we originally value elephants and support conservation” and “it is not an 
issue of money; elephants are pests, even full compensation can never alleviate my fear and 
remedy my indirect cost”. However, the other 126 (60.6%) farmers believed a reasonable 
market-based compensation could mitigate their antipathy towards elephants and increase 
their tolerance of coexistence.    
 
Other types of HEC 
Despite rubber attacks, farmers in Shangyong PA also experienced loss of other economic 
crops (most were rice and maize), and the changes of crop composition and livelihoods due to 
crop raiding. 65.4% (n=136) of farmers stated their preferences to plant more crops like 
maize, rice, bananas, and beans assuming their farms were not within the elephant range.  
 
WTP of Chinese tourists for elephant conservation 
Characteristics of tourists  
Among 210 tourists, 123 (58.6%) were male and 87 (41.4%) were female. 80 (38.1%) were 
“young” people under 28 years old, 120 (57.1%) were “middle age under working” from 28 
to 55 years old, and 10 (4.8%) were “senior citizen retired” above 55 years old. Most tourists 
(n=160, 76.2%) had travelled from other provinces of China, and only 45 (21.4%) were local 




WTP of tourists  
The mean WTP of tourists was $10/person. Specifically, 190 (90.5%) tourists were willing to 
pay for elephant conservation, and their WTP lay mostly in the range from $2 to $16 /person 
(Fig.4.7). There were 37 (17.6%) people even willing to contribute more than $32.  
 
Fig. 4.7 Willingness to Pay of Chinese tourists for wild elephant conservation (n=210) 
 
Tourists’ perceptions towards HEC  
Acknowledgement of HEC 
134 (68.1%) tourists knew about HEC, whilst 32% stated their unfamiliarity.  
 
Suggesting mitigation methods of HEC 
Most tourists thought either enhancing governmental compensation or relocating farmers 
within the elephant range could effectively mitigate HEC, and only 12 people considered 
maintaining the current elephant population, which was the opposite of farmers’ perceptions 
about a decrease in elephant numbers. In addition, 30% of tourists suggested crop insurance 





















Chapter 5 Discussion 
Rural perceptions, government policy and its implications for rubber expansion and 
elephant conservation 
Among different land uses, rubber is positively associated with farmer’s HEC experience and 
rural intolerance, which demands future HEC mitigation priority in China. This study 
demonstrated that farmers cultivating large-scale rubber and dependent on latex harvest 
(villages in Shangyong and east Mengyang) had a higher probability of elephant crop-raiding, 
ranked elephants as the main crop pest and the biggest obstacle to agriculture and livelihoods 
improvement, and held declining conservation opinions towards wild elephant. Specifically, 
as depicted in CIT and CIF models, rubber holders perceived wild elephants as a big problem 
to life and livelihood, they tended to oppose or only conditionally support conservation if 
economic loss was offset, and they favored the decrease and even extirpation of wild elephant 
populations in China. 
 
This was primarily due to the competition on land and resources. The spatial overlap between 
the preferred natural habitats of Asian elephants and suitable areas for rubber growth results 
in Human-elephant encounters and conflicts. Usually, highly productive areas abut reserves 
sustain high human density and create more opportunities for HWC (Woodroffe et al. 2005). 
The greatest rubber expansion in XB occurred in the productive lowland areas (<900m) at the 
expense of conversion of tropical seasonal rain forest (forested areas at an altitude < 800 m) 
and mountain rain forest (forested areas at an altitude between 800-1000 m) where elephants 
mainly inhabited (Liu et al. 2006, Li, Ma and Liu 2009a, Li et al. 2007). According to this 
study, most rubber plantations attacked were adjacent to Shangyong PA at the elevation 
ranging from 600 to 950 meters. Since China’s land use policy reforms in 1978, the 
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implementation of the Household Responsibility System has stimulated expanding rubber 
smallholdings across XB when land tenure was transferred from collective community to 
individuals and households were empowered to make decisions on land use (Fu et al. 2010, 
Liu et al. 2006). In only three decades, forest area was reduced by 28% at an annual 
deforestation rate of 1.12%, and tropical seasonal rain forest was the most affected (67% loss) 
(Li et al. 2008). Associated with deforestation, high levels of forest degradation and 
fragmentation made the remaining habitats disconnected, small in size and inhospitable to 
elephant’s migration and survival, and has driven elephants to forage on farms and come into 
conflict with rubber holders. Similar findings were found in Anamalai hills of southern India 
where HEC intensity was positively correlated to the extent of eucalyptus plantations, which 
pointed the need for better land-use plan (Kumar, Malizia and Koschinsky 2011). 
 
In the meantime, in rainforest habitats, elephants prefer the secondary forests associated with 
agriculture (Barnes 1996). In such a case, the high density of XB population makes the PA 
“hard edged” where secondary forests growing on the fringes closely connect to agriculture 
fields without a buffer, thus raising the probability of direct human-elephant contact. This 
contact is especially mounting associated with the increasing edges of forest fragments. 
Together with massive permanent land-use changes, XB has been also experiencing the 
intensification of agricultural regimes and a shift from traditional subsistence farming system 
by indigenous occupants to commercial plantation-dominated systems characterized by 
rubber monocultures (Huijun et al. 2002, Fu et al. 2010, Ziegler et al. 2009). These changes 
may aggravate wild food shortage inside PA and drive elephants to approach 
human-dominated landscapes because the traditional slash-and-burn cultivations on collective 
forests could yield extensive secondary growth and create habitats favorable to elephants 
during rotating periods. China’s Green Industry policy and Sloping Land Conversion 
 70 
 
Program in the late 1990s additionally promoted this replacement of swidden fallows by 
rubber on slope sites to increase “forest cover” which could simultaneously generate cash 
income (Liu et al. 2006, Ziegler et al. 2009). Moreover, a large proportion of rubber holders 
intercropped maize, mountain rice, peanuts and beans with young rubber plantation at the 
early stage, which increased risk of crop raiding and rubber mortality.  
 
Besides myriad negative environmental impacts, sweeping rubber in XB also exerted 
socioeconomic influences on shaping local intolerance to wild elephant. Firstly, because 
farmers tolerate damage to high-value cash crop least (Messmer 2000), destruction of 
lucrative rubber will trigger extreme local hostility. A study in Waza-Logone region also 
showed that farmers opposed conservation and perceived elephants as “no benefits to 
communities” due to substantial economic loss (Tchamba 1996). In particular, it takes 8-year 
management of immature rubber plantations before revenue gains, and seedlings and saplings 
less than 5 years old are most vulnerable to elephant attack. Therefore, attacks on young 
rubber would decrease local tolerance dramatically and intensify HEC when farmers’ initially 
long-period investment is ruined but without any profit return.  
 
Secondly, high dependence on rubber has simplified local livelihood and has increased 
farmers’ vulnerability to rubber damage (Fu et al. 2010, Xu et al. 2005, Huijun et al. 2002). A 
comparative study over 50 years in XB showed that the villages were experiencing excessive 
loss of crop variety, food security and income source diversity with the homogenous rubber 
expansion (Fu et al. 2010). Driven by the appealing market price of rubber, most available 
labor of households was utilized for latex tapping, and farmers tended to abandon traditional 
subsistence agriculture and purchased rice from the outside market. Despite the decrease of 
agrobiodiversity, another study in Menglun Township also found the loss of livestock of 
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households as a result of rubber plantations, represented as the reduction of buffaloes which 
were regarded as an indicator of family wealth by ethnic minorities (Liu et al. 2006). This 
was directly attributed to the restriction of grazing areas and fear of potential damage to 
rubber. Similarly in this study, most rubber famers especially those from Shangyong PA 
solely rely on rubber, and many households have already rented rice fields to external 
enterprises and currently buy food with the cash gains from rubber. Lack of livelihood 
flexibility and other income sources raises farmers’ high dependence on latex revenue. Free 
market of smallholder rubber, fluctuation of latex price, lack of governmental protection, and 
monopolization of trade by large enterprise in China in addition increase the households’ 
vulnerability to rubber damage (Fu et al. 2010, Xu et al. 2005, Liu et al. 2006). Consequently, 
elephant depredation on the economically dominant crop will promote local intolerance and 
inspire animosity to problem wild animals.  
 
Thirdly, increasing democratization, liberalization and attention from media may also reduce 
local tolerance with the formulation of arising sensitivity and awareness that rural 
communities should gain more profitable use from wildlife instead of bearing the cost 
(Woodroffe et al. 2005). Household income in XB has boomed in folds since the introduction 
of rubber together with better access to road and market. Affluence and external influence 
brought out materialist values into communities that emphasized quality of life, economic 
and physical security and self-expression (Manfredo and Dayer 2004). These changes in 
resources use, life style and perspectives of values further intensify HEC through growing 
farmers’ expectations to offsets of wildlife-inflicting damage. 
 
On the other hand, communities growing tea especially Bulang people stated a much more 
supportive perception to conservation. Compared with rubber, tea is less profitable, and more 
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elastic to attack as elephant trampling cannot cause high mortality; and tea hills are a more 
open landscape and may function as buffers to reduce risk of HEC whilst rubber plantations 
resemble a forestry type and may provide a temperate shield before an elephant approaches 
the crop field. Long stays of wild elephants in rubber plantations was frequently reported by 
farmers. Moreover, tea villages interviewed are located inside remote Mengyang PA with 
dense forest cover. Plenty of wild food supply and smaller anthropogenic disturbance may 
reduce crop-raiding incidents. Away from market and poor access to external world may also 
retain the simple essentiality of indigenous inhabitants who have lived in nature for 
generations, are accustomed to human-wildlife interaction and inclined to tolerate wildlife 
damage more. However, it is noted that rubber has started to grow in this region and west 
Mengyang will be probably converting into large-scale rubber monocultures in a near future. 
If a comparable study was to return to the same villages in about 10 years and ask the same 
questions, villagers would possibly have more negative opinions of animals as livelihood 
obstacle and object to wild elephant conservation. 
 
HEC tends to be even exacerbated if rubber expansion continues. Therefore, effective HEC 
mitigation will require law enforcement of conservation policy. There is a dilemma in XB 
between economic development and wildlife conservation. Protectionist laws establish nature 
reserves, promote habitat reforestation and prohibit killing of wildlife; whilst developmental 
policies advocate rubber industrialization and encourage decision-making of households on 
land-use plans. Therefore, HEC mitigation with land use planning should be necessarily 
incorporated into national policy, especially when the current Forestry Decentralization 
policy further assigns forestry tenure into individual households, together with the emergence 
of cold-resistant and high-yielding rubber varieties. This may potentially precipitate 
permanent conversion of remaining communal forests into rubber monocultures and at a 
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higher elevation. By 2050, conversion of forest and swidden-related secondary vegetation 
could increase in folders due to rubber expansion and other anthropogenic land-use changes 
(Ziegler et al. 2009). Therefore, supported by the national conservation and land-use policy, 
prior importance should be attached to curbing rubber encroachment into elephant ranges, 
especially in villages with no or early-stage rubber plantations which currently perceive 
conservation more positively (villages in west Mengyang PA).  
 
Religions and cultural thoughts towards elephants 
Traditions, cultures and religions also play an important role in forming attitudes to wildlife 
which are regarded as important symbols of religious deities and totems by indigenous 
inhabitants (Manfredo and Dayer 2004). The Dai (including Handai) are Hinayana Buddhist 
who worship nature and advocate kindness to all creatures (Xu et al. 2005, Manfredo and 
Dayer 2004); and the Bulang believes in a mixture of Hinayana Buddhism, polytheism, and 
ancestral worship culture which also encourages ethics to avoid injury and killing of wild 
animals (Xu et al. 2005). Specifically, wild elephants were worshipped as a mascot by Dai 
and Bulang ancestors in XB. Therefore, farmers from these ethnic communities held the most 
positive attitudes towards conservation propaganda and against a decrease of elephant 
numbers in the wild. Some farmers stated that wild elephant populations cannot decrease 
because “elephants open the forest for us”, “we collected their feces to make the medicine”, 
“they create patches to grow mushroom”, “they are the manifestation of a deity and 
inviolable” and “they are just innocent animal and not intended to cause damage”. In addition, 
respondents also pointed to their existence value for generations, aesthetic value and 
economic value as “XB will lose tourists without elephants”. However, it is notable that the 
widespread introduction of rubber is gradually eroding customary institutions and diverse 
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cultures in XB, exemplified as the irrevocable replacement of traditional ‘‘holy hills’’ by a 
homogenous landscape (Xu et al. 2005, Liu et al. 2006). A Dai village in this study also 
narrated the abandonment of their religious fete to worship elephant as a result of substantial 
rubber loss to HEC.  
 
Economic compensation perceived as an effective HEC mitigation measure in XB 
Locally, noise-makers together with fire and light were most commonly used to deter wild 
elephants in XB. However, habituation of elephants makes these traditional ways passive, 
ineffective and discarded. 33% of the farmers interviewed in Mengyang and Shangyong 
stated that no traditional measures were taken currently to prevent elephant damage. The 
earthen wall built as barriers to prevent elephant in Shangyong PA also collapsed due to poor 
maintenance and moist tropical climate in XB. Thus, there is a pressing need to seek for 
alternative strategies to mitigate HEC through increasing local tolerance.  
 
To solve HEC, both rural residents and Chinese tourists prioritized a compensation scheme 
by authorities as a viable measure. Around 65% of the households in XB suggested that prior 
importance in the future should be attached to the governmental compensation, and 126 
(60.6%) smallholder rubber farmers in Shangyong believed a reasonably market-based 
compensation could mitigate their antipathy towards elephants and increase their tolerance of 
coexistence. This shows that farmers generally think compensation works, and their current 
negative attitudes to wild elephant and discontent to insurance scheme may be largely due to 
insufficient payment. The fraction value of payment usually makes compensation less 
successful (Nyhus et al. 2003). In addition, regarding to the perspective from Chinese tourists, 
either enhancing governmental compensation or relocating farmers at elephant range was 
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thought to be effective in mitigating HEC. However, impractical and ethical issues regarding 
relocation indicate compensation to be the most viable solution.  
 
Adopting insurance scheme in mitigating HEC in China 
Insurance, as the improvement of the traditional economic compensation, has been recently 
adopted in solving HEC in XB. However, to be cost-effective, the current insurance scheme 
requires actuarial analysis incorporated with explicitly spatial risk. 
 
In principal, insurance is based on risk and emphasizes on the fair market-value 
compensation. Nevertheless, despite an innovative attempt in solving HEC, the current 
insurance mechanism in China allocates premiums evenly and compensates rubber loss at a 
uniform price (about $2/Tree) regardless of age and the geographic productivity. Its exclusion 
of the spatial variations of risk to, and cost of, elephant depredation would lead to funding 
allocation inefficiency and conflict mitigation inefficacy. 
 
To genuinely increase local tolerance to wild elephants in XB, this study assessed current 
compensation and put forward an actuarial rubber insurance scheme tailored to local 
conditions in Shangyong PA. This region demands HEC mitigation priority because of its 
largest-scale rubber plantations, severest HEC, least local tolerance and most negative 
perceptions towards the current insurance scheme. The results found that the probability, age 
and cost of rubber killed by elephants in 2011 were considerably different among villages and 
towns. Different payouts were also calculated, aiming to provide spatially explicit monetary 




Generally, HWC is a localized event termed as idiosyncratic shock that one may suffer a 
“surplus loss” to wild animals whereas the neighbors are almost unaffected (Dickman et al. 
2011). Similarly in Shangyong, conflicts were unevenly distributed and risk of elephant 
attack on rubber varied considerably among villages. Specifically, villages located in the west 
underwent intense conflicts centering on Mengman town. Nanping showed the highest rubber 
mortality (7.01%) followed by Shangzhongliang, Manfen and Hetu, forming a conflict 
gradient that risk increased with the approaching to the PA. In contrast, villages in the east 
experienced a rather lower conflict level. In addition, the poor utilization of forest areas of 
wild elephants inside Shangyong PA due to cross-border poaching (Lin et al. 2008) also led 
to severe damage in certain regions. Elephants will move away from areas where conspecifics 
are killed, and as a result, remaining herds would be crammed into smaller areas and cause 
highly localized damage to surroundings (Woodroffe et al. 2005, Nelson et al. 2003). 
Therefore, an effective insurance mechanism demands a primary mitigating effort focusing 
on the conflict hotspot. 
 
Despite the site-specific variation of HEC intensity, rubber attacked by elephants also 
differed in age and productivity, leading to the substantially different cost borne by villages 
ranging from $7/Tree in Xiaolongha to $16/Tree in Dashujiao. Based on rubber mortality 
caused by wild elephants and average cost to repair damage, this study specified the 
full-indemnity annual payout for rubber in individual village and suggested the total payout at 
the town level. Applicably, this payout can provide explicit baseline for future premium 
setting while adding in the administration cost and profit margin of given insurance firms. In 
fact, marked difference in rubber payout (premium likewise) was evident among villages. For 
instance, Shangzhongliang demanded an annual payout over $340/Ha ($0.25 million in total) 
while that of Zhongnanxi was only $0.38/Ha ($83 in total). At the town level, Mengman 
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required a payout about $0.47 million per year whilst that of Mengpeng was only $9,171. 
Therefore, to be more cost-efficient and investment-effective, surplus premiums of villages 
from the low-conflict or no-conflict region (the east Shangyong PA) can be re-allocated to 
complementing the villages in the high-conflict center to the west, instead of the current 
geographical even-insured payment strategy. Practically, to a large scale, central funding can 
be majorly distributed to Mengman town to insure farms exposed to high risk of elephant 
depredation. 
  
Meanwhile, it is noted that high-risk rubber farms are usually proximate to PA with a hillier 
and steeper topography and are inferior in productivity (pink area in Fig.2.2). Therefore, 
one-off payment for reforestation in such areas to amplify natural habitats of wild elephants 
seems more rational and effective to mitigate HEC, rather than expensively insuring these 
low-productivity and marginally profitable farms every year. For example, rubber mortality is 
highest in Shangzhongliang and Nanping (up to 6% to 7%) and the annual premium exceeds 
$300/Ha. Hence, the high risky rubber plantations adjacent to Shangyong PA in these two 
villages could be targeted for future reforestation. Additionally, according to the results, 
rubber mortality is highly age-associated and 92% of the elephant attack happened to rubber 
saplings and seedlings younger than 5 years. As for cost-efficiency, there could be an 
insurance scheme only focusing on young rubber instead of insuring farms of all ages, which 
demands further research to map rubber-age distribution across XB. Additionally, generalized 
linear model (GLM) could be applied to identify explicitly spatial correlates of HEC in the 
following research, thereby facilitating the better understanding of conflict pattern and 




Adopting cost-sharing mechanism to ensure insurance viability and sustainability   
Insurance allows the allocation of risk and responsibilities of stakeholders for conflicts. 
Specifically, to ensure sustainability, it emphasizes on the involvement of community 
premiums and conservation funds. Nevertheless, the current insurance mechanism in China 
more likely functions as the traditional centralized economic compensation that is solely 
funded by the central government whereas implemented by a third party – the insurance firm. 
Its exclusion of farmers and other participants may cause financial overburden of government, 
leading to compensation insufficiency and inefficacy.  
 
This study estimated the anticipated payout adequate to sustain this insurance scheme in 
Shangyong and tested a premium cost-sharing insurance scheme that is multiple -stakeholder 
participant. If insurance guarantees the full payment ($7- $16/Tree based on rubber age and 
productivity other than $ 2/Tree), a total $0.5 million annual payout is required in Shangyong 
PA to insure its surrounding rubber farms under risk. However, it is just a minimum 
estimation of the actual insurance premium. Firstly, in reality, plus administration fees and 
profit margins of insurance companies, the actual premiums will be much higher than the 
current estimation of payout that only considers the coverage of rubber loss. Besides the 
expected cost (payout) on random event – the probability of damage occurrence and the 
average cost borne by the insured, a sufficient premium includes the management costs of the 
insurer to make the trips to verify loss. Additionally, insurance firms are for-profit in a 
competitive capital market. Before determination of the premium prices to sell the risky 
securities to policyholders, insurers will assess the risks through underwriting and charge a 
percentage of premiums to accept those risks. In particular, a fair premium also estimates the 
profit and cost of equity capital while investing the proceeds collected from insured parties 
into the capital market and considers the dynamic effects of timing of cash flows, risk of 
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inflation and uncertainty of basic economic state variables (Kraus and Ross 1982). Therefore, 
the payout here could only suggest the minimum baseline of the actual premium’s price 
setting in Shangyong. Secondly, if the affected farmers abandon rubber plantations after 
elephant attack and give up replanting, a loss of rubber NPV over 25 years’ life span will be 
incurred. Thirdly, this study only considers premium for rubber, but HEC involves an array of 
other types including raiding on other crops, infrastructure damage and people injuries, 
leading to a higher demand for premium in insuring the wild elephant -inflicting loss in 
Shangyong.  
  
In addition, regarding HEC in the other four towns in Mengla and Mengyang PAs and other 
types of HWC like damage inflicted by deer and wild boar, the expected insurance premium 
will far exceed the governmental central budget which was $0.45 million in 2010 and 1 
million in 2011 for wildlife insurance (XB Nature Reserve Bureau, 2011). Therefore, 
importantly, a fairer compensation in par with market value requires the substantial increase 
in premiums fund-raising. Currently, the insurance were sponsored by the central government, 
but the envisioned premium budget may face uncertainty. Although the law in China 
prescribes the government to pay for household’s loss caused by wildlife, the term 
“government” is unclearly defined which could be either the central government or the local 
governments. This vagueness adds instability to the sustainable funds and limits liability of 
authorities. Especially, the regional forestry department and wildlife department are usually 
based at remote PAs and face financial and logistic constraints. Therefore, to raise 
diverse-source funds to ensure the sustainability of insurance and relieve the financial 
overburden of authorities, this study considered a partnership between the government, 




1. The governments: who establish nature reserves to conserve wildlife and entitle elephants 
as an Appendix I CITES protected species and a tourist “flagship” species. With an interest to 
conserve wild elephants and as the custodian of wildlife, they are generally perceived to be 
responsible for elephant-inflicting damage in the context of China. According to this study, 
87% of farmers in XB thought that governmental organizations should be responsible for 
HEC mitigation and 55% of Chinese tourists suggested governmental compensation as the 
possible HEC solution. In a long run, implementation of this government-involved insurance 
scheme requires a clearly prescriptive administration section.   
  
2. The local farmers: who face the conflicts directly, bear the economic cost and may be 
interested in securing their crops. HEC is essentially a direct outcome of the excessive 
anthropogenic land-use changes (Nelson et al. 2003), and sweeping rubber expansion 
constitutes the leading cause of lowland forest conversions in XB. Habitat destruction and 
forest fragmentation provoke HEC at the PA border, and it was found that the larger area of a 
farmer’s rubber farm was associated with a higher risk of elephant depredation. Therefore, 
rubber holders ought to bear the risk to convert natural elephant habitat and undertake the 
responsibility to protect their own assets. This sharing payment insurance encourages local 
involvement and would help to allocate risk and benefit households to withstand economic 
cost from the mechanisms of community-based risk management. In the meantime, instead of 
“buying” community compliance, this scheme considers farmer’s willingness that ensures the 
engagement of local people in genuinely managing the problem and deciding the appropriate 
compensation to pay. Based on this study, the WTP of farmers around Shangyong PA could 
contribute about 18.5% to the entire insurance premium and rural residents bearing greater 
losses were more willing to insure their rubber plantations. Specifically, farmers’ WTP could 
even sustain their own insurance scheme in Mengpeng town without any external funding 
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and contribute to the major premium in Shangyong town (61%). However, due to highly 
intense HEC events, Mengman town still requires substantial external financial assistance. 
 
3. The tourists: who are interested in wildlife well-being and benefit from animal’s aesthetic, 
existence and ecosystem values. Booming tourism has expanded its markets towards 
“ecological experiences” towards forest and wildlife over undeveloped natural areas. As an 
endearing and fascinating animal, wild elephants have attracted thousands of tourists to visit 
Elephant Valley located in Mengyang PA of XB. The number of visitors to Elephant Valley 
was 1.04 million in 2009 and 2010 and 1.21 million in 2011, which showed an increasing 
trend (XB Nature Reserve Bureau, 2011). Theoretically, direct, indirect, opportunity, and 
cultural costs of living alongside threatening wildlife of rural residents should be spread and 
allocated to the wider beneficiaries through payments to encourage coexistence (PEC) 
(Dickman et al. 2011). Through “non-consumptive but sustainable” use of wildlife like 
tourism, there is a promise to achieve conservation goals concurrent with local economic 
development. Tangible revenues from wildlife can offset costs of coexistence, increase local 
tolerance, enhance consciousness of wildlife and promote supportive conservation attitudes 
towards crop raiders when people realize the number of wildlife is economically linked to 
their incomes. This study proves the feasibility of PEC in China. WTP of Chinese tourists for 
HEC mitigation to conserve wild elephants reaches as high as $10/person, and for example, 
extraction of a certain percentage of the tickets revenue of Elephant valley could largely 
contribute to conservation fund-rising and sustainably complement the financial deficiency 
for insurance. Over 1 million tourists with $10/person willingness would raise an annual 




Despite different interests, these three main buyers can be practically jointed under a same 
goal: raising funds to fairly compensate farmer’s loss (through the way of purchasing crop 
insurance) and increase the tolerance of coexistence with wild elephants. Besides ensuring 
the program sustainability with diverse funding sources, such a cost-sharing mechanism can 
also enhance the accountability when stakeholders are overseeing each other. Through 
insurance scheme, insurer will censor damage reported by farmers and avoid fraudulent 
claims, and accountability on insurance firms can be strengthened through government 
oversight if both government and famers co-pay the insurance premiums. In the meantime, 
involvement of public funds can engage third parties such as NGOs and improve 
accountability through the oversight of NGOs or perhaps government-NGO collaboration.   
 
Direct use values of tourism  
Tourism help to preserve an array of species and ecosystems due to its high direct use values 
from commercial success (Gössling 1999). This study proves the direct use values of tourism 
in XB which can contribute to an annual > 10 million fund to mitigate HEC, about 10 times 
of the present central budget. Especially, the gross value of tourism will be even higher if we 
include entrance admission, lodging, transportation, food and other services (Gössling 1999) 
besides tourists’ voluntary donation for elephant conservation. Revenues from only one 
popular area “Elephant valley” already have the potential to outweigh the cost of living 
alongside elephant borne by farmers in China and could function as conservation incentive. 
In particular, as a worldwide attractive flagship species, elephant can consistently attract 
tourists and ensure a successful and sustainable ecotourism project (Kruger 2005). However, 
in this area, the authorities may poorly recognize the considerably high values of this wild 
elephant related ecotourism industry and directly apply these values to solving 
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elephant-inflicting problems. Usually, a major proportion of the appreciable tourism profits 
may accrue to a single park and confine the applicable scale of a wider biodiversity 
conservation (Gössling 1999). Therefore, this study reemphasizes the high direct values of 
tourism and suggests the larger linkage of these revenues to conserve wild elephants in China 
beyond accumulating to the tourism attraction itself.  
    
Potential pitfalls of insurance scheme       
However, it is noted that insurance is not the panacea to solve HEC. It sounds appealing but 
linking economic compensation to positive conservation outcomes is difficult, and retaliatory 
killing may still occur even if farmers gain offset (Dickman et al. 2011, Naughton-Treves et 
al. 2003). In this study, a big proportion of farmers stated even the full compensation could 
not eliminate their hatreds towards elephants. Despite the tangible cost of living with wildlife, 
the imposed intangible cost in terms of fears, trauma, opportunity cost, social cost as time and 
efforts for damage prevention, emotional cost of losing crops and eviction from PAs also 
inspire animosity, and sometimes overweigh direct economic loss. Pre-emptive killings 
sometimes happen resulting from fear and perceived danger as opposed to actual attacks 
(Woodroffe et al. 2005, Dickman 2010). More than 80% of respondents perceived elephants 
as a big threat to safety and they dared not to go out after dusk. Rubber holders expressed 
more worries due to a higher probability for them to encounter elephants when tapping latex 
during the evening. Several farmers also stated that they had to abandon work some nights 
due to elephants and lost considerable latex revenue.   
 
Moreover, although fraction value of payment usually makes compensation less successful, 
another problem called “moral hazards” may occur even if receiving adequate compensation 
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according to the market value. Knowing that the damage inflicted by elephants will be fully 
compensated, individual farmers may be less likely to adopt new (or improve existing) 
management practices that may be costly, but may reduce their current efforts to discourage 
conflicts and prevent crop damage (Woodroffe et al. 2005). Probably, farmers may simply 
grow rubber seedlings closer to elephant routes, invest no management but get fully 
compensated. Therefore, making a monetary deduction in payment could encourage local 
incentives to protect their crops when they bear some of the risk and have to pay part of any 
loss.  
 
Additionally, verifying damage quickly and making payment timely are the key determinants 
of insurance program success. Delaying investigation makes it less easy to ascertain damage 
and farmers tend to overstate and attribute losses to elephants (Naughton-Treves 1997, 
Sekhar 1998). This may lead to conflicts between compensation seekers and payment 
wardens. In underdeveloped and remote areas, illiteracy and poor institutions mechanisms 
may further lead to fraud and difficulties in submitting claims for compensation (Dickman et 
al. 2011). In Shangyong, smallholder rubber famers perceived the insurance scheme most 
negatively and most censures pointed to the inefficiency of insurance company and delays in 
payment for damage. In reality, Mengla Township where Shangyong PA is located is 200 
kilometers away from the insurance company based in Jonghong. Associated high 
administration costs considerably reduce in-time field investigation and payment. In 
Shangyong, rubber damage was censored only once to twice a year according to farmers’ 
statements and several villages received extremely low or even no compensation, which 
strengthened animosity to conservation and intensified conflicts with insurance agents. 
Therefore, before fair-price compensation, funding can be allocated, in the first place, to 
ensure accuracy and efficiency of damage verification through adequate staff and training. 
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Low claims being verified can also raise hostility from farmers, which undermines the initial 
intention to minimize HEC, and sometimes, even worsens the problem while increasing local 
expectations but without alleviating HEC (Dickman et al. 2011). In India, villagers 
experienced substantial economic cost by tigers and elephants but compensation ratio was 
low (Madhusudan 2003). Another study in Wisconsin found that rural communities receiving 
compensation of loss tolerated wolves less than those who were never compensated 
(Naughton-Treves et al. 2003). In this study, villages in Shangyong receiving rubber 
compensation lower than 22% were more likely to oppose the insurance scheme and elephant 
conservation. This means that if an insurance system is going to be implemented, it needs to 
run properly.  
 
Finally, although the insurance program can be sustained through a premium cost-sharing 
mechanism, WTP does not always translate into the actual payment especially at the 
community side. As premium payment is based on a voluntary transaction, willingness of 
individual households to be engaged into the village-based risk management may differ due 
to further conflicts heterogeneities at the household level. This may add uncertainties in 
running this larger-scale insurance scheme at village and town level. To improve this model, 
a more detailed risk assessment targeting at households demands future research, thereby 
facilitating the insurance implementation tailored to individual rubber farmers.  
 
Policy suggestions  
Seeking for HEC mitigation alternatives to compensation 
Compensation is not a silver bullet. Insurance itself is not likely to engender positive attitudes 
towards “pests” and extirpate conflicts. Hence, avoiding damage could be far more 
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cost-effective to mitigate HEC than pure compensation. For example, constructing wildlife 
barriers may be more efficient to build preventive spatial separation between people and 
wildlife. In Shangyong, villagers also suggested the primary use of compensation funds in 
conflict avoidance (repairing and maintaining the collapsed elephant trench). Furthermore, 
maintaining and maximizing elephant habitat in Yunnan is a prerequisite for the proposed 
insurance scheme to work in the long run, where the nature reserves in XB are highly isolated 
and facing severe human pressure on borders and rubber expansion is continuing reducing 
elephant habitat. For this purpose, construction of biological corridors (connecting 
Shangyong PA to Mengla PA, and Menyang PA to Menglun PA) (Li et al. 2009b) and 
reforestation at inferior rubber plantations on reserve borders can be implemented. This 
increase of habitat size and connectivity will greatly benefit elephant conservation, because 
wide-ranging species are most likely to become extinct from small reserves irrespective of 
population size, resulting from the higher human-induced mortality at the border than death 
from stochastic processes (Woodroffe and Ginsberg 1998). In India, Kumar et al. (2010) 
suggested the protection of elephant habitat fragments and vegetation along its migration 
routes to reduce direct human-elephant encounters. In Tanzania, the local pastoralists leased 
communal land to a consortium of tourism operators and agreed on restricting agriculture and 
overgrazing, which contributed to the wildebeests population recovery (Nelson et al. 2010). 
In addition, China’s neighboring country Laos possesses a large area of intact forests and 
retain the potential to accommodate and increase wild elephant populations (Riddle et al. 
2009). Shangyong PA closely adjoins the Nam Ha Conservation Area of Laos, and the 
formulation of international cooperation at the national border including anti-poaching 
campaign could directly contribute to elephant conservation and HEC mitigation. Finally, 
appropriate restoration of traditional farming practices such as swidden agriculture and 
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appealing to institutional norms, traditions and cultural beliefs may be other valuable tools in 
resolving HEC. 
 
A fair and transparent political dialogue to guarantee funds distribution and insurance 
accountability  
The majority of current revenue streams from tourism usually accrues to governments and 
external tourism enterprises and is rarely distributed to local communities, and these 
imbalances in costs and benefits can lead to continual habitat destruction and widespread 
wildlife persecution (Dickman et al. 2011, Woodroffe et al. 2005, Balmford and Whitten 
2003). To genuinely mitigate HEC, it is important to form a mechanism of revenue 
distribution for conservation into the political framework, enhance law enforcement and 
avoid elite capture and interpersonal conflicts. Especially in this study, the cost-sharing 
insurance scheme suggests PEC from Chinese tourists as a potentially sustainable funding 
source for elephant conservation, and practical implementation of this scheme requires the 
censors, monitoring and cooperation from multiple governments and perhaps the external 
NGOs. In addition, it is equally important to improve accountability on both the insurer and 
insured sides with a legitimate, unbiased mechanism for conflict-resolution. In particular, the 
availability of low-cost adjudication would be necessary. For instance, timely damage 
verification and payment can be achieved through the collaboration between the insurance 
company and the local wildlife departments whose stations are distributed widely around PAs 
and who have already built mutual truth with communities based on experiences over years.  
 
Establishment of wild elephant monitoring system and formulation of up-to-date risk assessment  
It is noted that the mobility of wild elephants can change the spatially explicit risk across XB, 
exemplified as the eastward movement of conflict center from the border of Shangyong PA to 
the further communal forests since 2009. Therefore, a long-term viable insurance scheme 
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requires the timely updates of conflict distribution and intensity. Incorporating wildlife 
monitoring system of wildlife department into insurance risk assessment can enhance the 
flexibility of this insurance scheme and provide accurate monetary targets for premium 
allocation. Especially, calculation of insurance premium is based on the probability of 
elephant attack that is determined by over years’ data, and this study would provide protocol 




XB is the foremost sanctuary for wild elephants. However, increases in human populations 
and democracy, changes in resources use and life style, and reforms on land-tenure regimes 
have exacerbated HEC in this area. Farmers cultivating different crops perceived 
conservation differently. Especially, land holding size of rubber was significantly associated 
with declining conservation attitudes. Rubber expansion is the leading cause of HEC. At first, 
forest conversion into rubber monocultures leads to natural habitat destruction and 
fragmentation. Shrinking home ranges and less wild food availability drive wild elephants to 
forage on farms and necessarily come into conflicts with human. In addition, high livelihood 
dependence on rubber increases smallholder’s vulnerability to rubber attack, and high cost to 
repair the damage consequently reduces local tolerance and stimulates animosity to elephant 
conservation. Despite a homogenous landscape, rubber is also eroding cultural diversity in 
XB.  
  
The current insurance scheme in XB is not community based, and this standardized payment 
is following a traditional compensation pattern. To increase local tolerance of smallholder 
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rubber farmers, I considered and tested an actuarial insurance scheme in Shangyong PA 
based on the spatial variation of HEC intensity and rubber productivity. There were 
considerable differentiation of rubber mortality among regions, and cost to repair damage 
also varied due to productivity and age differences. To ensure the sustainability, I further 
advocate the cost-sharing insurance mechanism which reverses a trend from a purely and 
passively governmental-compensation dependent mechanism to a diversely and actively 
multi-stakeholder participant insurance scheme. Involvement of local communities and 
Chinese tourists can sustain this scheme in the long run, but its practical implementation 
requires governmental support. In addition, there are pressing needs to seek for compensation 
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